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Abstract
In this dissertation, I argue for an approach to transitional justice that analyzes the diverse
and dynamic ways in which people experience armed conflict and its aftermath. I question what
actually changes during a state’s “transitional period” and illuminate how transitional justice is
utilized, politicized, and manipulated by powerful actors. Throughout this dissertation, I examine
the varied experiences of people who endured gross violations of human rights as children,
according to international law, and who are now, within that legal framework, adults. I follow
the lives of victims of Nepal’s armed conflict as they transition out of what is recognized in
international law as a temporary phase known as “childhood” and explore what they recognize as
constant and temporal in their own lives as the Nepali state undergoes its own transition, also
argued to be a temporary phase, transitional justice. I inquire how diverse identities and patterned
inequality are reconstituted through processes of transitional justice and contend the façade of
the inclusion serves as a distraction from claims for equitable access to power and resources. A
key argument of this dissertation is that the performance of transitional justice in Nepal,
including the performance of redressing human rights violations experienced by victims and
addressing the needs of the most vulnerable victims (e.g. children), functions to conceal
international complicity in as well as the state’s commitment to maintaining structural inequality.
Following ten years of armed conflict to ameliorate historically sedimented inequity, state-led
transitional justice mechanisms have served to entrench the exclusion of economically,
politically, and socially marginalized groups and ensure Nepalis’ continued distrust in the
national government. Thus, while addressing structural inequality may be beyond the reach of
normative transitional justice mechanisms, the Nepali context demonstrates how processes of
transitional justice cannot redress conflict-era gross violations of human rights without
redressing inequitable systems of power.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We are living in a double reality. One reality is I need money, but the other reality is I
know this is not the best thing that I could be doing in the world. I know that working
with the UN is not the best option to promote peace in the world, but there is not an
alternative option. There are very excellent, good, and best people in the UN, but they are
not in the capacity to change the whole system. The system is so big that when you enter
into it, you are trapped. You are not allowed to write papers. When you are in the UN,
your freedom is gone. You cannot write any articles in the newspaper. It would have to
go to New York to get approval from the communications section. Once they approve it,
you can do that. So, once you are in the UN, you're trapped and your personal freedom is
gone. You are everywhere traced, you are coined as a particular brand, you're not allowed
to interact with certain people. So, you are something different, more animal than human.
Even from that level, again, I will say there is no option...There are some organizations
that are trying hard to develop an alternative model, but they are not succeeding because
they always have to please the powerful who have money. And the source of power, to
my mind, is very disintegrated. The people who have arms, the people who have money,
and the people who have these two big things are the power. So, those who have more
arms, more money are powerful, and they have the power of coercion, not the power of
peace. So, that’s the world. We cannot change it.
I was sitting next to Udaya,1 one of the primary people in charge of implementing peace
education programs and curricula in Nepal. She was an educated, English speaking, and by
international development standards, successful Nepali woman who had agreed to meet me at her
office for an interview in July 2013. We were in a conference room sitting at the far end of a
long table in a building used for the day-to-day activities of an international non-governmental
organization.
I was surprised that Udaya was saying these things to me. I had started to expect that staff
from organizations involved in transitional justice and peacebuilding would interact with me in
ways that seemed like a performance for donors evaluating the implementation of their
programs. Processes of transitional justice, typically implemented after an armed conflict, aim to
redress violations of humanitarian and human rights law as well as facilitate justice,
reconciliation, and democratic political transitions. These processes may include prosecutions,
truth-telling, reparations, vetting, memorials, and the reform of government institutions.
Peacebuilding processes, under which peace education would typically be categorized, aim to
establish peace and prevent the resurgence of armed conflict. The United Nations (UN),
1

The names of all interviewees in this dissertation are pseudonyms.
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powerful international donors, and international non-governmental organizations typically offer
financial and logistical support for peacebuilding and transitional justice. Udaya’s statement was
her response when I strayed from my interview schedule and asked her how people make sense
of the contradictions in transitional justice and peacebuilding work. In the response quoted
above, she described what came to be common themes during my research.
One such theme, in various iterations, is money. Although Udaya didn’t believe that the
work she was doing would make the world a better place or create world peace, one reason she
was working on peace education was the salary it provided her. For her, this constituted two
realities. In one reality, she must justify her work to herself and its funders, because she needs
the money that her job (promoting peace) provides. On the other hand, she knows that there are
better alternatives to the UN, donor, and international non-governmental organization models for
transitional justice and peacebuilding. Yet, there is a larger system that even “excellent, good,
and best people” cannot change because powerful actors prevent it.
Processes of transitional justice are intimately connected to a liberal peacebuilding model
touting freedom as a primary goal. Freedom, in this context, is defined in terms of individual
citizens’ ability to democratically elect leaders to “represent” them. According to this definition,
nation-states ideally transition from previously repressive modes of governance to liberal
democracies, and perpetrators of human rights violations that occurred under previously
repressive regimes are prosecuted. Hypothetically, in this model, if individual citizens are given
the right to vote and perpetrators of human rights violations are prosecuted, then the violations
will be redressed and peace will be sustained through democracy. Yet, Udaya said, “when you’re
in the UN, your freedom is gone” and described people working in the UN system as “trapped”
even as they are promoting freedom and democracy. It is within this framework that less
powerful nations are forced to comply in order to receive international aid. Calling such political
transitions “democratic” is somewhat ironic given that national leaders are beholden to powerful
nations rather than accountable to their own citizens.
Udaya’s perspective evokes two additional themes I encountered during my research:
power and the lack of alternatives. A common thread in my interviews with victims, Nepali
politicians, diplomats, donors, UN staff, and people implementing state-led mechanisms of
transitional justice is some iteration of a lack of alternatives and feeling as if they are trapped in a
system in which more powerful actors control outcomes and systemically prevent meaningful
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transitions that would improve the lives of Nepalis. However, these powerful actors seemed
elusive. I kept seeking someone who would claim responsibility or power over processes of
transitional justice in Nepal to no avail. In Udaya’s comments, these powerful actors are
anonymous, identified only as “the people who have arms” and “the people who have money.”
The power, she says, is of coercion and not of peace: “So that’s the world. We cannot change it.”
Her job is implementing education programs in Nepal as a mechanism to promote peace after the
cessation of Nepal’s ten-year (1996-2006) internal armed conflict between the Communist Party
of Nepal-Maoist and the Nepal government. The view she expressed to me would not be
implemented into any peace education program nor would she would express it openly to staff at
donor agencies, international non-governmental organizations, or the UN. It’s a contradiction she
tries to make sense of as she is doing this work “for peace.” She does it for the money. She does
it, she said, because there is no possible alternative.
I scheduled an interview with Udaya because I had been told during my preliminary
research in 2013 by staff at various organizations and government offices that children were,
along with women, the “most affected” by Nepal’s armed conflict. As I began researching how
children were affected and what mechanisms or programs were implemented on their behalf,
however, additional themes became apparent. One, there was no agreed upon definition of
“children” or “conflict affected children” by those implementing programs for those groups.
And, further, most organizations implementing peacebuilding programs or transitional justice
mechanisms didn’t have a “transitioning” definition of children. By this I mean that the children
they spoke of in interviews and conversations didn’t seem to age. They were presented as static,
frozen in time.
During my preliminary research, two other key themes were present in interviews,
conversations, and my observations that align with existing literature on transitional justice in
Nepal: inequality and the perceived problem of caste and ethnic identity within the nation-state.
Ethnicity and caste are closely linked to vast economic, social, and political inequality. Scholars
have criticized transitional justice policy and practice, particularly in Nepal, for its elitism and
failure to redress hierarchies of power and inequality (Robins 2011, 2012, 2013; Sajjad 2013,
2016). Although transitional justice is often presented in official documents and webpages
produced by UN organizations and international non-governmental organizations as neutral,
existing scholarship has illuminated how it is inescapably political (Hazan 2017) and examined

3

the ways in which international influences over processes of transitional justice reinforce unequal
systems of power (Ní Aoláin 2009; Wilson 2001). Within the liberal democratic peacebuilding
approach, ethnic and caste identity is a problem in Nepal insofar as it must be accommodated to
fit into a nationalist model of governance. There is a long history of power struggles related to
diverse identities and inequality in Nepal deeply connected to the armed conflict, and, as I argue,
processes of transitional justice. A key argument of this dissertation is that the performance of
transitional justice in Nepal, including the performance of redressing human rights violations
experienced by victims and addressing the needs of the most vulnerable victims (e.g. children),
functions to conceal the state’s commitment to maintaining structural inequality.
Transitional justice models base their legitimacy in international law, primarily human
rights law and humanitarian law. It is according to these legal norms that violations must be
redressed and perpetrators must be brought to justice. The origins of what is now referred to as
transitional justice traces its origins to the post-World War II establishment of international
tribunals created to prosecute war criminals. Although international human rights laws
addressing diverse identities and inequality have been codified, those legal documents have yet
to be prioritized in ways that change structures of power, thus ensuring ongoing discrimination
and extreme poverty. Although the UN treaty system now officially recognizes all rights-from
civil and political to economic, social, and cultural- as justiciable, in most countries undergoing
processes of transitional justice, including Nepal, the mechanisms have typically focused on
redressing the following violations, often categorized as “gross” violations of human rights:
murder, torture, sexual violence, forced disappearance, arbitrary arrest and abduction, forced
displacement, and the recruitment of child soldiers.
To come back to my interview with Udaya in 2013, my questioning of how she makes
sense of the contradictions in her work was spurred by her detailed explanation of what would
need to happen for Nepal to experience lasting peace. Among the themes she discussed were
what she viewed as problematic homogenizing international development and its influence on
the perpetuation of similarly problematic homogenizing nationalism, resulting in discrimination
and “un-peace.” She explained,
I think all international development frameworks that are homogenizing the world are
problematic. Why am I forced to speak English? Because of this homogenization and
education, thousands and thousands of languages are dying every day. When language
dies, knowledge dies, isn't it? So we are killing something for our comfort. Because I
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know English, you should know English. So, we actually learn how to dominate small
minorities…but the same policy [as in India] was brought to Nepal in 1956. An American
came from India to Nepal to decide the education policy. He decided there should only be
one language in Nepal, but there were more than 100 languages in Nepal. There was a
clear policy: if you don't speak Nepali, you are not Nepali. So, it was systematic
suppression and oppression of the people. Even today, the school leaving certificate from
the children who attend in grade 1 out of 100 only two are getting to grade 10, only two.
And mostly those are Nepali native speakers. Why? Because the others can't sustain in
the school. Because if you can't speak clear Nepali, how can you pass? That is the kind of
exclusion we have done. It is not only in Nepal. It's everywhere in the world. So, we
made a standard frame. So everyone has to fit this. I cannot change this. This policy has
also systematically oppressed the people in Nepal particularly. I can give you many
examples. That is the cause of violence. That is the cause of the absence of peace. If I
say, ‘speak Nepali with me. Otherwise, I will slap you,’ your peace will go down
immediately, isn't it? So, that is the cause of un-peace in the life of Nepali people.
Attention to existing hierarchies and inequalities is particularly important in Nepal where
the systemic political, social, and economic exclusion and stigmatization of certain groups have
been identified as factors in the conflict (Joshi 2009; Lawoti 2010; Mani 2008; Pasipanodya
2008; Robins 2011, 2012; Sajjad 2013; Thapa and Sijapati 2003). Nepal’s armed conflict was
fueled by demands for the redress of social, political, and economic injustices. While statistically
Nepal was showing an increase in economic growth and the expansion of development in the
1990s, the “income share of the top 10 percent of people increased from 21 percent in the mid1980s to 35 percent by the mid-1990s, while the share of the bottom 40 percent shrank from 24
percent to 15 percent by the mid-1990s” (Lawoti 2010; quote in Sharma 2006:1243). Thus, when
the armed conflict began, many people were experiencing extreme poverty and vast economic
inequality, including inequitable access to land ownership, forests, and water (Lawoti 2010).
Large segments of the population were excluded from the benefits of development, and poverty
levels were substantially higher in rural areas than urban areas. Significant inequalities existed
based on caste and ethnic group membership as well. “High” caste male elites continue to
dominate powerful positions, including the head of state, the judiciary, the legislature, academia,
and non-governmental organizations in addition to having greater access to resources, including,
for example, education and land (Ibid). The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist directly
confronted these issues and demanded land redistribution, free and equitable access to education,
healthcare, roads, drinking water, and electricity (40 demands as cited in Thapa and Sijapati
2004: 211-218).
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Transitional justice policies are closely related to development policies and frameworks
based on modernization theory. Within all of these models, social and political progress are
marked by comparing “less developed,” “Third World” countries to “developed” countries in
“the West,” and measuring their “backwardness” or “progress” by their commitment to
democratic norms and values, among other key indicators. This dissertation builds on the work
of previous scholars that have critiqued transitional justice as an “industry” that obscures the
complicity of powerful states and neoliberal policies in human rights violations, illuminated how
global power inequities are reproduced through processes of transitional justice, and called for
transitional justice to address inequality and structural violence through “distributive justice” and
“transformative justice” (e.g. Aguilar and Gómez 2011; Bergsmo, et al. 2010; Gready 2010;
Gready and Robins 2014; Mani 2008; Ní Aoláin 2009; Robins 2011, 2012, 2013; Sundar 2004).
Ironically, as transitional justice policy simultaneously creates and homogenizes victims
of human rights and humanitarian law violations, it is based on an ideology of hierarchy and a
teleology where the nation-state modernizes, becomes developed, and progresses towards a
liberal democracy. In other words, the state is theorized as transitioning, but the people within
the state are treated as static and homogenous. More specifically, victims are often homogenized
in discourses on transitional justice as if their experience of a gross violation of human rights
alone determines their needs during and after an armed conflict. Although greater attention has
been drawn to the impact of armed conflict on children since the Convention on the Rights of
Child came into force in 1990 (see also Graça Machel’s 1996 report highlighting the topic), how
children’s needs change over time and how the combined experiences of being a victim and, for
example, poor, female, “low” caste, and located in a rural village, impacts their ability to access
processes of transitional justice, are not considered in scholarship or policy. Further, attention to
“the local,” often opposed to “the global,” encourages nationalist policies and practices that fail
to account for heterogeneity within national contexts. In countries undergoing processes of
transitional justice after an internal armed conflict, a nationalist “local” is exclusionary to the
most marginalized victims within a nation-state. Although human rights law and humanitarian
law recognize social diversity, transitional justice policies homogenize victims, arguably as part
of the nation-building project. Because processes of transitional justice are typically focused on
the transition to a newly/differently governed nation-state, it is unsurprising that such processes
fail to focus on difference, discrimination, and inequality within a state where nationalism is
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likely prioritized to facilitate the political transition. Nationalism, as Calhoun argues, “has played
a central role in the development of ‘essentialist’ thinking,” or reducing “diversity in a
population to some single criterion held to constitute its defining ‘essence’ and most crucial
character” (1995:18). Within such conceptualizations, people are thought to belong to one
nation, one “race,” and speak one language without contemplation of the ways in which people
understand themselves as members of different organized collectivities (i.e. families,
communities, international organizations) and identities simultaneously, and further, it’s taken
for granted that people’s identities can change over time (Ibid: 18-19).
Overarching Arguments and Summaries of Chapters
In this dissertation, I argue for an approach to transitional justice that analyzes the diverse
and dynamic ways in which people experience armed conflict and its aftermath. I question what
actually changes during a state’s “transitional period” and illuminate how transitional justice is
utilized, politicized, and manipulated by powerful actors. Throughout this dissertation, I examine
the varied experiences of people who endured gross violations of human rights as children,
according to international law, and who are now, within that legal framework, adults. I follow
the lives of victims of Nepal’s armed conflict as they transition out of what is recognized in
international law as a temporary phase known as “childhood” and explore what they recognize as
constant and temporal in their own lives as the Nepali state undergoes its own transition, also
argued to be a temporary phase, transitional justice. By focusing on the chronological transition
of victims’ biological age, I highlight people’s dynamic lived experiences during Nepal’s
political transition. I inquire how diverse identities and patterned inequality are reconstituted and
performed through processes of transitional justice and whose interests are served. I contend the
performance of inclusion through state-led transitional justice mechanisms functions to conceal
international complicity in as well as the state’s commitment to maintaining structural inequality
and serves as a distraction from claims for equitable access to power and resources.
In the next chapter, I outline my research methodology. I conducted 14 months of
ethnographic research in Nepal May-July 2013 and January-December 2016 primarily in two
districts: Kathmandu and Bardiya. In addition to being the headquarters for Nepal’s national
government, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, diplomats, and donors, the primary
institutions responsible for implementing state-led processes of transitional justice are all located
in Kathmandu, Nepal’s capital. Bardiya was one of the most affected districts during Nepal’s
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armed conflict (in terms of gross violations of human rights), is primarily rural, and the majority
of people living there are politically and economically alienated from the nation’s capital city. In
both districts, I had conversations and conducted semi-structured as well as informal interviews
with victims of Nepal’s armed conflict, including prominent members of victims’ organizations,
in addition to members of Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions, Nepali government officials,
diplomats, donors, and staff from the UN, international non-governmental organizations, and
non-governmental organizations. Additionally, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 14
Nepalis who experienced a gross violation of human rights as a child, as defined in international
law (younger than 18 years of age), in both Kathmandu and Bardiya (28 total) to analyze how
victims understood and evaluated transitional justice mechanisms. My fieldwork also entailed
observing eleven key events, including victims’ groups meetings, memorials, conferences,
demonstrations regarding transitional justice, and meetings hosted at the Transitional Justice
Resource Centre.
Examining Nepal’s social structure and political history in Chapter Three, I discuss the
connections of Nepal’s armed conflict to social, political, and economic exclusion. I pay
particular attention to communist movements in South Asia, Nepal’s peace agreement, and
transitional justice processes following the armed conflict. I argue Nepal’s history of patterned
inequitable access to power and resources, along with the exacerbation of inequality due to
international development aid and neoliberal policies, must be examined to analyze how
processes of transitional justice and ongoing social, economic, and political exclusion are
historically sedimented and continue to be contested.
In Chapter Four, I analyze the perceptions and experiences of adults who were children
when their fathers were killed or disappeared during the armed conflict in Nepal. I examine
theories of children and armed conflict and challenge homogenizing, fixed conceptualizations of
“children” and “the local” within transitional justice scholarship and practice. I argue age alone
does not determine children’s vulnerability during armed conflict and call for the redress of
entrenched systems of domination and inequality.
Chapter Five draws attention to the meanings victims and their families in Bardiya, a
rural and largely poor region of Nepal where 52% of the population is from the indigenous Tharu
community, assigned to education and highlight their experiences of inequitable access to
scholarships targeting “conflict affected children” as part of Nepal’s Interim Relief Program. I
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argue that discourses of knowing/not knowing are instrumental in the concealment of power and
the perpetuation of marginalization and inequality in Nepal. Through examining the scholarship
provision for “conflict affected children,” I contend the barriers conflict victims in Bardiya
experience trying to access scholarships demonstrate not only that structural inequality still exists
during the “transitional” period but that the state is committed to maintaining it.
I focus on Nepal’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Commission of
Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons in Chapter Six. Through observation of and
interviews with facilitators and victims about the “complaint-taking” processes of both
commissions, I analyze the performance of inclusion and show how marginalized victims were
systemically excluded from these truth-seeking processes. Despite the lack of inclusive practices
implemented at the national level and minimal international support, Nepal’s truth-seeking
commissions received more than 58,000 complaints. I examine the inclusion of “children” in the
commissions’ policies, question facilitators’ understandings of “children” in the Nepali context,
and include the diverse experiences and perceptions of the commissions by two Nepali males
who were tortured by soldiers in the Nepal Army when they were younger than 18 years of age.
Rather than redress the human rights violations they experienced during armed conflict, I
maintain that by excluding victims generally, and marginalized groups specifically, processes of
transitional justice in Nepal have entrenched inequality and distrust in the government. Within
this context, justice, as defined by victims, remains elusive both now and in the foreseeable
future.

9

Chapter 2
Research Methods
Research Design and The “Field” in Time and Space
I conducted 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Nepal from May to July 2013 and
from January to December 2016. In 2013, I conducted preliminary research in the Kathmandu
Valley and five districts of the Mid-Western Region, including Banke, Bardiya, Dang, Surkhet,
and Rolpa. Although I was already working to learn the Nepali language, a male research
assistant fluent in Nepali and English traveled with me to all districts in the Mid-Western Region
in 2013 and served as my translator during all interviews. Kathmandu, Nepal’s capital, is the
headquarters of the primary institutions involved in the administration of transitional justice
mechanisms at the national level. The Mid-Western Region of Nepal is considered to be the most
affected by Nepal’s armed conflict in terms of the greatest number of casualties and enforced
disappearances. During my preliminary research in 2013, I conducted semi-structured and
informal interviews with people involved in processes of transitional justice in Nepal, including
conflict victims, national and local politicians, local peace committee members, and staff from
UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and governmental organizations. These
interviews revealed that perceptions of effective redress regarding human rights violations
experienced by Nepalis varied among and between the aforementioned groups; additionally,
these interviews illuminated a common perception: that women and children were “the most
affected” by Nepal’s conflict. I observed critical events regarding transitional justice in Nepal,
including demonstrations by victims’ groups and “fortnightly talks” presented at the Transitional
Justice Resource Centre in Kathmandu. In addition, I conducted archival research at the
Transitional Justice Resource Centre and the Kathmandu School of Law examining local
literature and other resources, including news articles, victims’ groups’ publications, and a
conflict mapping database. My initial study allowed me to narrow my research sites to two
districts, Kathmandu and Bardiya. Bardiya was one of the most affected districts during the
armed conflict. The most enforced disappearances during the armed conflict occurred in Bardiya,
and members of the indigenous Tharu community were disproportionately affected.
When I returned to Nepal in January 2016, I initiated my research in Kathmandu.
Everyday life was noticeably different compared to 2013 due to the fuel crisis that had been
ongoing since Nepal’s new constitution was promulgated in September 2015. Compared to 2013,
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taxi rates had tripled, and public transportation was slow, scarce, and uncomfortable as space on
buses was extremely limited. Traveling from my residence in northwest Kathmandu to central
Kathmandu by bus took an hour and a half and sometimes two hours one way. I often watched
from the bus window as people loudly argued while waiting in line for cooking gas, which, along
with petrol was being rationed by the Government of Nepal. The family I stayed with in
Kathmandu was noticeably tense about the scarcity of cooking gas, petrol, food, and medicine.
Additionally, since I left Nepal in 2013, national elections were held with the Nepali Congress
Party (NC), a center-left party, capturing the highest number of votes and their leader, Sushil
Koirala, becoming the prime minister in February 2014. In October 2015, the Communist Party
of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), a moderate communist party, captured power
and Khadga Prasad Oli was the prime minister when I returned in January 2016. From the time
of the first post-war elections in 2008 until 2016, Nepalis witnessed eight changes of
government. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of
Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) had both been established, the country
had endured a 7.8 earthquake, and a new constitution had been promulgated.
Regarding processes of transitional justice, by January 2016, the TRC along with the
CIEDP and the National Human Rights Commission formally requested that the Government of
Nepal amend the Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act,
2014 (TRC Act), in accordance with the 2014 Supreme Court verdict that declared amnesty
provisions unconstitutional. Yet, the TRC Act remains unchanged since its promulgation in May
2014. Due to the government’s refusal to amend the TRC Act, in February 2016, the UN
formally declared their lack of support for Nepal’s truth commissions. Prominent diplomats,
donors, international non-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations have
also expressed their lack of support based on the amnesty provision in the TRC Act. In March
2017, the TRC and CIEDP announced they would begin “accepting complaints” from victims in
mid-April. Although initially limited to 60 days, the commissions extended the acceptance of
complaints to 90 days total.
After the commissions began accepting complaints, I decided to conduct research in both
districts throughout my 12 months of fieldwork allowing me to maintain contacts and attend
events in Kathmandu and Bardiya. By December 2016, I had traveled to Bardiya from
Kathmandu and back four times. Traveling between field sites allowed me to observe
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complaint-taking processes, victims’ organizations’ meetings, demonstrations, and conferences
in both districts. In addition, by May 2016, I had developed relationships with victims and
transitional justice facilitators in both districts. In Kathmandu, I observed demonstrations
regarding transitional justice in front of national government offices, utilized libraries for
archival research, and maintained contact with government officials and non-governmental
organizations involved in transitional justice advocacy or policy implementation and with
members of national conflict victims’ organizations based in the capital. In Bardiya, I conducted
research in multiple rural villages and in Gulariya, the district headquarters. For the safety of my
informants, I have not included the names of the villages where I conducted research. Bardiya
District is located in the Terai (the lowland region of southern Nepal), borders India, and is
primarily rural and agricultural.
In May 2013, I initiated formal language training in Nepal. Over the summer of 2015, I
attended the Summer Intensive Nepali Language Program at Cornell University and continued
my language training in Nepal during my fieldwork in 2016. Interviewees were given the option
of speaking the language of their choice. Thus, I conducted interviews in English, Nepali, and
Tharu or some combination thereof. My research assistants served as translators for interviews
conducted primarily in Tharu and/or Nepali. My primary research assistant was Pooja
Chaudhary. Ms. Chaudhary is fluent in Tharu, Nepali, and English and translated during
interviews in Kathmandu and Bardiya. Because she was pursuing her law degree, I worked with
three additional research assistants when Pooja was unavailable. In Bardiya, I worked with a
male research assistant, Ajit Dahit, fluent in Tharu, Nepali, and English who was pursuing a
degree in Microbiology. My male (Ajit Dahit) and female (Pooja Chaudhary) research assistants
in Bardiya were both members of the Tharu community. In Kathmandu, I worked with two
female research assistants, Bandana Aswasthi and Asmita Poudel, who were both fluent in
English and Nepali. Asmita Poudel was pursuing a degree in Conflict, Peace and Development
Studies and working at a non-governmental organization as a Gender and Transitional Justice
Officer. Bandana Aswathi was a graduate student pursuing a degree in Anthropology. All the
aforementioned research assistants resided primarily in Kathmandu and served as translators
during interviews.
In addition to providing translation, all of my research assistants offered their own
insights into my research. After interviews, I had conversations with research assistants about
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their reflections, asked questions for clarity, and sought their perceptions of my insights and
ongoing analyses. They also provided valuable practical advice in terms of appropriate phrasing
of interview questions and etiquette before, during, and after interviews. When interviewees
invited us into their homes, I frequently looked to my research assistants for guidance on
appropriate behavior and phrasing of words. Pooja Chaudhary, in particular, guided my words
and actions in ways that helped me to develop respectful relationships with informants in
Kathmandu and Bardiya. At times during my research, I lived with and shared food with Pooja’s
and Ajit’s families. I referred to Pooja as my younger sister and Ajit as my younger brother.
Although I did not live with their families or refer to them with familial terms, Asmita and
Bandana were incredibly friendly to me and supportive of my research. I am grateful for the
relationships I developed with all of my research assistants. Their guidance and support were
fundamental to my being able to conduct my dissertation research.
The following questions and objectives guided my research. First, how did children
experience the armed conflict relative to their position in Nepali society? To examine this
question, I conducted analyses of conflict reports issued by the United Nations, international
non-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The examination of
factors shaping their experiences was based on my analysis of historical patterns of
marginalization and discrimination in Nepal, my experience in the field, and victims’ perceptions
of their own position in Nepali society as revealed through ethnographic interviews. Secondly, I
questioned how Nepalis who experienced gross violations of human rights as children viewed
the effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms. Relatedly, I wanted to know how
differences in social distinctions, such as gender, age, caste, ethnic group, political and religious
affiliation, access to resources, and region of residence shaped their ability to access transitional
justice mechanisms. Finally, I sought out the perspectives of Nepalis who experienced gross
violations of human rights as children on the Nepali government, justice, reconciliation, the
ongoing peace process, and other political dynamics in Nepal.
These initial research questions led to additional inquiries during the course of my research
and analysis. I began to critically investigate how structural inequality was reconstituted through
transitional justice, and relatedly, who had the authority to implement transitional justice policies
and why. I also wanted to understand what I saw as the performance of inclusion through
transitional justice and what political work was being accomplished through the façade of
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inclusion. I utilized ethnographic methods, including semi-structured and informal interviews,
conversations, participant observation, observation, and archival research.
My fieldwork entailed observing eleven key events, including victims’ groups meetings,
memorials, conferences, demonstrations regarding transitional justice, and meetings hosted at the
Transitional Justice Resource Centre. I conducted semi-structured and informal interviews and
had conversations with victims of Nepal’s armed conflict, including prominent members of
victims’ organizations, as well as members of Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions, Nepali
government officials, diplomats, donors, and staff from the UN, international non-governmental
organizations, and non-governmental organizations.
Additionally, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 Nepalis who experienced a
gross violation of human rights as a child (as defined in international law-younger than 18 years
of age), who had since transitioned into adulthood (within international law-18 years of age or
older) in both Kathmandu and Bardiya (28 total) to analyze how victims understood and
evaluated transitional justice mechanisms. Further, people who were affected by conflict as
children from different castes, ethnic groups, genders, religious and political affiliations and with
varying access to resources were interviewed in both districts allowing a comparison of their
experiences of conflict and the “transitional” period. Victims’ ongoing social and life-cycle
transitions are frequently disregarded, and this dissertation contributes to transitional justice
scholarship and practice through emphasizing the significance of victims’ dynamic and varied
lived experiences. Interviewees were identified through conversations with prominent members
of victims’ organizations as well as village leaders and snowball sampling. During the course of
some interviews, interviewees revealed that they had not experienced what would be considered
a gross violation of human rights within international law. Although those interviews are not
counted in the 28 total listed above, they were all transcribed and analyzed. My analysis of
interviews with people who were affected by armed conflict as children (younger than 18 years
of age) but did not, according to international law, experience a gross violation of human rights
also contributed to the arguments in this dissertation. Interviews focused on perceptions of (1)
justice and reconciliation regarding the human rights violation(s) they experienced during the
armed conflict and the ongoing peace process in Nepal, (2) “effective” redress of the violation(s),
(3) existing transitional justice mechanisms, specifically truth-seeking commissions and the
Interim Relief Program, and (4) the Nepali government. All interviewees were asked to self-
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identify their demographic data and interviews were coded by age, gender, caste, ethnic group,
marital status, access to resources, region of residence, education, occupation, religious
affiliation, and political affiliation. Although most of these codes were discussed over the course
of the interview, I created a personal data sheet to ensure all interviews were coded as
consistently as possible. Following every interview, interviewees were given a form to complete
asking their (1) age, (2) gender, (3) marital status, (4) number of children, (5) current/natal
region of residence, (6) religious affiliation, (7) political party affiliation, (8) group membership,
(9) caste/ethnic group, and (10) the highest level of education completed by themselves, their
children, and their parents. Regarding access to resources, the personal data sheet listed questions
about their and their families’ (1) occupation, (2) ownership of house, land, and livestock2, (3)
income, and (4) economic struggles. My research assistant offered to assist interviewees as they
were completing their personal data sheet.
In international human rights and humanitarian law, “children” are codified uniformly
according to biological age. However, conceptualizations of children in Nepal are diverse and
the perceived transition into adulthood is more complex than reaching a certain biological age.
Scholars have illuminated how, in Nepal, transitions into adulthood are marked by getting a job,
becoming physically developed, and understanding appropriate behavior (Kohrt and Maharian
2009). When I asked their age, many of my interviewees paused. After some thought, all of my
interviewees were able to respond to questions regarding their current age and date of birth. Yet,
several interviewees asked if I wanted their real age or their age according to their citizenship. In
Nepal, births are not typically registered with the government. At the age of 16, Nepalis are
eligible to go to their local government office and register as citizens. At that time, their date of
birth is registered as part of the process. For some of my interviewees, they registered their date
of birth as earlier, making their officially recognized age older, typically with the hopes of
securing employment in sectors with an age bar. Because transitional justice aims to redress
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, I focus on Nepalis who were
children according to international law (younger than the age of 18) when they experienced a
gross violation of human rights. I asked interviewees for their accurate date of birth to determine
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See, for example, pages 29-31 in this dissertation on how inequitable access to land was
significant in Nepal’s armed conflict. Owning livestock can be a marker of a family’s livelihood
and access to food, particularly in Bardiya, which is primarily an agricultural district.
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if they were younger than 18 years of age during the armed conflict. All interviewees selfidentified as either male or female, and, in both Kathmandu and Bardiya, I interviewed seven (14
total) males and seven (14 total) females.
In Nepali, “jat” is often used without distinction to denote what in English is categorized
separately as “caste” and “ethnic group.” However, since the 1990s, the term “janajati” has
become more popular in Nepali to describe what in English might be termed “ethnic group” as
well as the phrase “adivasi janajati” translated to English as “indigenous nationality” or
“indigenous ethnic group” (Gellner 2007; Shneiderman 2013). Gellner (2007) traces this
distinction and the Nepali neologism to Indian origins, coming into Nepali from Bengali, via
Darjeeling, and argues the distinction of “janajati” is similar to the distinction between caste and
tribe in India. The timing of this distinction is correlated with the end of a period in Nepal known
as the Panchayat era, during which Nepalis were encouraged to portray themselves as
homogenous (though not equal). The Panchayat era ended in 1990 with an uprising known as
“The People’s Movement” (jana andolan) leading to a new constitution that declared Nepal was
a “multiethnic,” “multilingual,” “Hindu,” democracy. Subsequently, membership in a janajati
group was viewed by some as a political advantage in a country where high caste Hindu men
dominated every aspect of politics (Ibid). Issues surrounding the ongoing marginalization of
people from “low” caste and janajati groups have remained contentious after the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement marking the cessation of Nepal’s armed conflict in 2006. For
example, contention over the 2015 constitution, over which the fuel crisis occurred, was due to
the continued political exclusion of historically marginalized groups as exemplified through the
determination of Nepal’s newly demarcated federal provinces.
In Nepal, everyone is aware of their “jat,” which has important implications in everyday life
often determining their access to resources and representation in government. Surnames are
typically a marker by which “jat” is revealed. Asking someone which caste group they belong to
can be offensive, particularly for marginalized groups. Oftentimes, people’s last names do mark
their membership in a particular group. Yet, it was important for my research to understand my
interviewees’ perceptions of their membership in a particular group and how it affected their
everyday lives, experiences of armed conflict, and access to mechanisms of transitional justice.
Interviewees often brought up their “jat” during the interview. They were asked to clarify not
only others’ perceptions of their “jat” but also their understanding of the concept while
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completing the personal data sheet. I administered the personal data sheet at the end of each
interview first explaining why it was important for my research to gather data on sensitive
personal questions and assuring them their name would not be associated with the information
they provided. I interviewed Nepalis affected by armed conflict as children from multiple “jats”
in Kathmandu and Bardiya, including people who identified as Brahmin, Chettri, Gurung,
Magar, Madheshi, Tamang, and Tharu. In this dissertation, I primarily focus on the experiences
and perceptions of members of the Tharu community.
Interviewees’ and their family members’ occupations, annual income, as well as land,
livestock, and house ownership determined “access to resources” as a code. The interviewees’
and their family members’ level of education, and if they attended private or public school were
also considered in “access to resources,” but were coded separately. On the personal data sheet, I
asked interviewees if they struggled to buy anything on a regular basis. As with “jat,”
interviewees’ access to resources was discussed over the course of the interview in addition to
the questions asked in the personal data sheet. While questions regarding religious affiliation
were answered, albeit typically briefly and without hesitation, some interviewees preferred not to
initially disclose their political affiliations. There was a distinction made by interviewees
between membership in a political party and their perceptions of one political party being more
representative of the issues they valued. Over the course of the interview, or in subsequent
conversations or observations, their political views were revealed, and often their political
affiliation or membership. For many interviewees, this meant their continued refusal to affiliate
with or support any political party, and for others, their tentative support offered to one party
they considered only slightly better than any other political party. Yet, some interviewees
unabashedly proclaimed their support for and affiliation with a particular political party.
Interviewees were chosen based on purposive and snowball sampling techniques. In
purposive sampling, informants are chosen based on their experiences regarding the research
topic (Bernard 2011). In snowball sampling, informants are chosen based on recommended lists
from previous informants. Key informants that I met in 2013 aided in snowball sampling.
Purposive sampling and subsequent snowball sampling were extremely productive sampling
techniques to engage with members of the international community, domestic facilitators of
transitional justice, and victims. I gained initial entry into the Kathmandu-based transitional
justice arena, meaning meeting people involved in victims’ organizations, staff from UN
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organizations, international non-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations,
academics, and politicians during my preliminary fieldwork in 2013. When I visited the
Transitional Justice Resource Centre in 2013, I met the director, who was an anthropologist. He
personally invited me to programs hosted at the Centre and suggested people for me to interview.
When I struggled to establish a connection with someone, he called them on my behalf or went
with me to the initial meeting (suggesting it would later be easier to schedule an interview after I
had established contact in person). I also developed some of these relationships via email and
video conferencing from the United States until returning to Nepal in 2016. The connections I
developed by meeting, having conversations with, and interviewing people involved in
transitional justice during my preliminary fieldwork aided my access to interviewees in 2016.
During my preliminary research outside of the Kathmandu Valley, I established some
connections with members of victims’ organizations and non-governmental organizations that
were developed further in 2016. However, relationships with most of my interviewees and
informants in Bardiya were initiated during my fieldwork in 2016. To gain access in Bardiya, I
sometimes relied on my informants in Kathmandu to provide contact information and establish
contact on my behalf. In some government offices, I just showed up and, in others, I was able to
arrange a meeting before arriving.
Primary documents, such as press releases issued by victims’ groups and reports by the UN,
international non-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations, were
analyzed, and fieldnotes were taken throughout the research. Fieldnotes included details about
the place, space, and circumstances of my observations, interviews, and conversations (Emerson,
et. al 2011). I recorded interviewees’ and my own verbal and non-verbal responses, interviewees’
perceptions, and notes about our interactions and their interactions with others. I also took jot
notes during interviews, observation, and, at times, during conversations and participant
observation, and I utilized the jot notes to later to write full fieldnotes (Ibid). I primarily recorded
notes, and my research assistants sometimes aided in note taking.
I initiated data reduction and analysis in the field and throughout my data collection and
writing (Dewalt and Dewalt 2002; Emerson, et al. 2011 Dewalt and Dewalt 2002; Glaser and
Strauss 1967; Miles and Huberman 1994; Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1998). I entered fieldnotes,
primary documents, and transcribed interviews into Nvivo (qualitative data analysis software). I
then analyzed the data using inductive and deductive coding to identify patterns and themes.
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During analysis, I wrote theoretical memos to document applicable theoretical concepts related
to the data being analyzed, and I took integrative memos to clarify and link analytic themes and
categories (Emerson, et al. 2011).
Informed Consent and Safety Concerns
The safety of my informants was a primary concern during my fieldwork. All
interviewees were informed in writing and verbally the purpose of the interview, their
participation was entirely voluntary, and they could stop participating at any time. Interviewees
were encouraged to share their experiences and perceptions only as they were comfortable. All
interviewees were made aware that I was a Ph.D. student from the United States of America
conducting my dissertation research in Nepal.
Interviews were conducted with people affected by conflict as children with the
agreement that I would not include identifying information about them in any of my
publications. Further, I explained that I was not associated with the UN or any organization, that
I was writing a book and would like to include their stories and perceptions, and that I otherwise
was unsure what would happen as a result of my research. I said that I hoped to return but it was
possible this would be our only meeting. Interviewees were informed that their participation
would not directly result in them receiving any humanitarian aid or other compensation. I also
explained that I took an applied approach to my work and hoped that my research would
positively affect their lives. Yet, the only result I could reasonably assure them of was the
publication of my research. Interviews were conducted in private as per the preferences of the
interviewees. All interviewees were asked to choose if they preferred to be alone during the
interview or in the presence of their family members and/or friends. Most interviewees preferred
to be alone during the interview while others preferred the presence of one or more of their
family members (usually their mother) or a friend. During data collection and analysis, efforts
were made to ensure the confidentiality of respondents. After their interviews, all interviewees
were assigned a number and their names removed from their interview transcripts. All data
collected through fieldnotes with potentially identifying information was carried with me until it
was destroyed in the field during ongoing data reduction and analysis.
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Chapter 33
Historically Sedimented Inequality and Exclusion
This kind of structure is not created in a day. We're talking about the existing structure
and the effects of conflict and intervention while addressing that. If we look at the
intervention by the government in the form of the Interim Relief Program, there is no
visible discrimination at a face value. However, there is discrimination. For example,
torture victims and victims of rape and sexual violence are excluded…Based on gender,
in the scholarship [provision], there is no discrimination at face value by the government.
It is not said that okay only the girl child will get the scholarship or only the boy child
will get the scholarship. But the structure is that there is a kind of defacto discrimination
that takes place. In many places during the [distribution of] the Interim Relief Program,
many people didn’t have access to information about what kind of documents they
needed. In many places, their marriage was not registered. So, the state officials were
asking for documents that they didn’t have. Customarily and still many people who get
married have not registered. There is no practice of registering birth also. There is a kind
of discrimination compared to the people in the urban areas who have that kind of legal
registration. The people in the villages are discriminated against by the existing structure.
There is a kind of discrimination in the Interim Relief Program. So, those kinds of
practices are there.
I was having tea with Kavi who was working for a Kathmandu-based international nongovernmental organization as he explained to me that the discriminatory practices associated
with processes of transitional justice in Nepal were connected to historically sedimented
structures. Significantly, he highlights how, within transitional justice policy, the discriminatory
aspects may not be apparent to those unfamiliar with Nepal’s context. In this chapter, I highlight
the contestation and reiteration of historically sedimented power relations in Nepal. I argue
Nepal’s history of patterned inequitable access to power and resources, along with the
exacerbation of inequality due to international development aid and neoliberal policies, must be
examined to analyze how processes of transitional justice and ongoing social, economic, and
political exclusion are historically sedimented and continue to be contested.
Since the inception of the Nepali state, males from certain caste groups have been
politically and economically dominant (Whelpton 2005). As Guneratne (2002:72) argues, “from
the perspective of interethnic relations in Nepal, what is salient is that the landowning nobility,
the bureaucracy, and the higher ranks of the military were all drawn from the dominant Brahmin,
Chhetri, and Thakuri castes of the hills.” In 1768, Prithvi Narayan Shah unified Nepal after
3

Excerpts of this chapter are taken directly from Billingsley (2018).
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conquering various independent kingdoms and principalities, moved the capital to Kathmandu,
and established the Shah dynasty. Through the Shah dynasty, succession of power was passed
down based on the divine right of kings.
Following an organized massacre of political leaders and takeover of power, in 1846,
Jang Bahadur Rana initiated the Rana regime, which demoted the Shah King to a figure head,
established a system of hereditary prime ministers, and perpetuated the marginalization of “low”
caste groups. For example, in 1854, Rana enacted the Muluki Ain. This code of law divided
people into a caste system based on five basic categories: “wearers of the sacred thread,” “nonenslavable alcohol drinkers,” “enslavable alcohol drinkers,” “impure but touchable castes,” and
“impure but untouchable castes” (Höfer 1979). The categories were hierarchically ranked, and
the law included stipulations on socially acceptable practices, such as food taboos and the
prohibition of marriage between groups and adopting another group’s traditional professions
(Ibid). While these legal norms map onto sociocultural experience in complex ways and the
categories are fluid and contested through social practice, the Nepali state explicitly sanctioned
social hierarchies and codified discrimination. Further, the Nepali language and Hindu religious
practices were not only encouraged, but also legally endorsed by the state (Whelpton 1997).
These practices legitimized elite dominance and power and have continued despite political and
social changes in Nepal. Through each political change, ideas about the inherent inequality
between and among groups of people in Nepal have been encouraged and utilized to ensure the
power of some and the exclusion of others.
In 1951, with the support of the Indian government, Nepalis educated abroad, many of whom
were involved in the Indian independence movement, started a successful political movement
against the ruling Ranas. Talks were initiated to establish a constitution with a representative
form of government, and the Shah king, King Tribhuvan, called for the establishment of a multiparty democracy and the election of a Constituent Assembly. Despite numerous changes in
political power, Nepalis outside of dominant groups have continued to experience widespread
political exclusion and economic inequality. Political power and wealth are concentrated in
Kathmandu, and people living outside Nepal’s capital city have been consistently ignored by
those in power and excluded from access to resources. Further, since it’s inception, kings
residing in Kathmandu have demanded shares of resources and enforced systems of feudalism
throughout the country.
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In Nepal, diverse identities among those who reside within state boundaries has been
emphasized, reiterated, and contested through law, the rhetoric of political leaders, and in
national ceremonies. As Calhoun (1997) has argued, nationalism demands conformity. During
the Panchayat era in Nepal, from 1960-1990, Nepal was officially declared a Hindu Kingdom,
caste hierarchy was reinforced by the state, and attempts were made to induce conformity within
the nation through promoting homogeneous nationalism that ignored any form of cultural
difference. State leaders promoted the slogan “ek bhasa, ek dharma, ek bhes, ek desh” (one
language, one religion, one form of dress, one country). National holidays often included
performances that symbolized the union of the state with Hinduism (e.g. political leaders riding
in chariots with Hindu priests), and, before the fall of the monarchy in 2006, the king was
revered as an incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu.
Simultaneously, while political leaders were reiterating the nation’s homogeneity, they were
entrenching a hierarchy where “high” caste Hindu males from the hill region were placed in the
most powerful positions in Kathmandu and throughout Nepal. For people or communities who
did not conform or were marked as different, their Nepaliness, along with their value and notion
of belonging to the state, were questioned. Thus, even as the Nepali state promoted homogeneity
within a heterogeneous nation, it enforced a hierarchy that privileged “high” caste Hindu males
and marginalized the majority of people living within its boundaries. Despite the historical and
ongoing systemic state suppression of people in Nepal who spoke languages other than Nepali,
practiced religions other than Hinduism, and claimed an identity other than that prescribed
through Nepali nationalism, the most recent national census (2011) lists 125 caste and ethnic
groups, 123 languages, and six religions.
Political spaces opened in the 1990s as a result of Jana Andolen I (The People’s Movement),
during which historically marginalized groups mobilized en masse, and, as a result, a multi-party
democracy with a constitutional monarch was established. This allowed space for multiple
groups, particularly ethnic and “low” caste groups, to organize for rights and representation, and
Nepal was declared a multiethnic and multilingual state. While the 1990s are recognized as the
time when marginalized groups organized against the dominant order, indigenous groups overtly
and subtly contested their exclusion through rebellions and cultural preservation organizations
during the Rana and Panchayat periods (Caplan 1970; Hangen and Lawoti 2013; Sagant 1996).
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In addition, Dalit (“low” caste within the Hindu caste hierarchy),4 Madheshi,5 and Muslim
organizations seized their first opportunity to publically organize in the 1950s when Nepal was
first established as a democracy, but were repressed by the national government (Hangen 2009;
Hangen and Lawoti 2013; Thapa 2012). However, with more political space for dissention,
ethnic parties, non-governmental organizations, cultural associations, and identity movements
expanded greatly in the 1990s (Gellner, et al. 1997; Hangen 2007; Hangen and Lawoti 2013; Jha
1993; Lawoti 2005; Pfaff-Czarnecka 1999). As the 1990 constitution was being drafted, the
marginalization of certain ethnic, regional, linguistic, and religious identities became contested
political issues. Yet, “high” caste Hindu elites dominated the constitution-drafting process,
ignored the demands of marginalized groups, and promoted traditional Hindu nationalism
(Lawoti 2007; Lawoti and Hangen 2013). Thus, marginalized groups in Nepal, despite
organizing for greater recognition and rights by the state, remained excluded and dissatisfied
with the 1990 Constitution (Bhattachan 2013). It was within this context that the Maoists built
their movement, and Nepal’s internal armed conflict erupted in 1996.
The Communist Movement in South Asia
The beginning of the communist movement in Nepal can be traced to 1949 when the
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was established in Calcutta with the aid of Indian communists
(Lawoti 2010:5). The party grew in the 1950s, but secured only four out of 109 seats in the first
election to Parliament in 1959 (Ibid). During the Panchayat era (1960-1990) when political
parties were banned in Nepal, the communist movement spread discretely even as communist
parties were factionalized internally and suppressed by state power and politics. Influenced by
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The term “Dalit” is utilized as a self-reference and often refers to a political identity in South
Asia for people who are outside of the traditional four-caste system. Stigmatized as impure and
polluting and, thus, physically, economically, politically, and socially excluded, Dalits are also
disparagingly referred to as “untouchables.”
5
Although commonly utilized as a term to describe a group of people living on Nepal’s southern
border with India, the definition of “Madheshi” is contested. While political leaders representing
Madheshis in Nepal continually attest to their “Nepaliness,” dominant discourses often
categorize Madheshis as originating from and belonging to India (and thus undeserving of Nepali
citizenship or resources). After Nepal’s armed conflict, Madheshi political movements have
demanded a federal state for Madheshis and proportional representation as the people from this
group have continually been excluded from political and economic resources.
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the Naxalbari Uprising in India,6 in 1971, Nepali Communists also ignited a violent movement,
which, as in India, was brutally suppressed by the state. In 1978, this group became the
Communist Party of Nepal-Marxist Leninist (CPN-ML), and in 1990, CPN-ML merged with
CPN-Marxist to form the CPN-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and became a major
political party (Ibid).
The emergence of Maoism in Nepal is linked to the establishment of the CPN-Fourth
Congress in 1974, which after a number of splits became the CPN-Unity Center (CPN-UC), the
CPN-Mashal led by Puspa Kamal Dahal (“Prachanda”), and a breakaway faction of CPN-Mashal
led by Baburam Bhattarai (Lawoti 2010:6). The United People’s Front Nepal (UPFN) led by
Bhattarai was created by the CPN-UC to participate in elections, and then CPN-UC and UPFN
split before the 1994 mid-term elections (Ibid). In 1995, the CPN-UC, under the leadership of
“Prachanda,” was renamed the CPN-Maoist and initiated plans to start an armed conflict (Ibid:7).
In February 1996, the Bhattarai-led UPFN submitted a list of 40 demands to the Nepali
government outlining an ultimatum: “immediately initiate steps to fulfill these demands”… or
“we will be forced to adopt the path of armed struggle against the existing state power” (40
demands as cited in Thapa with Sijapati 2004:215-216).
The leaders of the Maoist movements in both India and Nepal, despite their own
positionality as highly educated and more privileged than “low” caste peasants, identified caste
and ethnicity, along with issues of feudalism and land, as key issues to be addressed. The
military tactics employed in both movements, in India beginning in the 1960s and, in Nepal in
the 1990s, focused on increasing the power of the rural poor to establish strongholds and then
take control of cities.
In both countries, the movements regained traction after increasing policies of economic
liberalization. Nepal’s 10-year internal armed conflict ignited in February 1996 just days after
Bhattarai sent a list of 40 demands to the government of Nepal, calling for, among other
demands, an end to the domination of foreign capital and stated the “invasion of colonial and
imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped” (40 demands as cited in
Thapa with Sijapati 2004: 213). As Leve (2007: 128) argues,
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In 1967, a violent uprising occurred in Naxalbari village in West Bengal during which peasants
attacked local landlords, seized land, cancelled debts, and burned records. The uprising led to a
larger movement, which spread rapidly, and inspired Maoist movements in both India and Nepal.
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Despite the fact that millions of dollars had been devoted to rural development, the
uneven distribution of aid benefits and political voice between urban centres and rural
hinderlands, between rural districts, and between classes of rural and urban people
themselves was recognized as a development failure and threat to the state.
While international aid and non-governmental organizations proliferated in Nepal before the
armed conflict, foreign aid did not ameliorate rural poverty. Rather, the economic divide between
those who benefited from development aid, primarily in Kathmandu, and people living in
extreme poverty in rural areas, only increased, as development aid and its benefits were most
accessible to elite, educated, urban residents. Donors and development organizations primarily
operate out of Kathmandu, and before the armed conflict, failed to prioritize the structural
changes that would have benefited marginalized and poor populations living in rural areas.
Further, donors, including the World Bank, advocated for the decentralization of education in the
1980s. Private schools subsequently proliferated in the 1990s (NESAC 1998:87 as cited in
Caddell 2006), which ensured increasing economic disparities between the poorest, rural
residents and people living in the capital with greater access to financial resources.
During the armed conflict in Nepal, Maoists destroyed loan documents, redistributed land
to the landless, and initiated development projects, such as small-scale industrial enterprises
(Thapa with Sijapati 2004). Additionally, Maoists distributed food at low prices to families in
need and encouraged inter-caste marriages. Taboos against widows and menstruating women
were revoked and gambling, alcohol, and superstitious religious practices were banned. Further,
private schools were shut down and teacher absenteeism ceased to be problematic in Maoist
strongholds (Ibid).
In both India and Nepal, particularly post 9/11, Maoists have been labeled “terrorists” by
the state enabling brutal state violence against civilians and combatants alike. While Nepal’s
Maoist movement is commonly conceptualized in terms of civil war or an internal armed
conflict, India’s Maoist movement is called an “uprising” or conceptualized as an eruption of
violence. Drexler (2010) argues the language of “civil war” prevents justice within transitional
justice contexts, because it obscures state violence and the complicity of powerful international
forces. Calling an armed conflict a “civil war” attempts to “localize” the violence within a
horizontal conceptualization by positing the conflict as between warring groups within a country
rather than between a state and its citizens (Ibid). Further, the language of “civil war” obfuscates
the complicity of powerful nations, and in Nepal, the increase in gross violations of human rights
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following an influx of international aid to “combat terrorism.” For example, in Nepal, the United
States (U.S.), India, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) supplied financial and logistical support to
the Nepal government to fight the Maoists despite documented human rights violations by state
security forces against civilians throughout the armed conflict. In this dissertation, I refer to the
“internal armed conflict” or “armed conflict” rather than utilize the phrase “civil war” to describe
the political violence in Nepal from 1996 until 2006. Scholars have drawn attention to how the
ways in which political violence is framed can determine its legitimacy and conceal state terror
and power inequities (e.g. Aretxaga 2001; Sluka 1999; Zulaika and Douglass 1996). As Sundar
(2004) argues, “in the formation of the violent subject, the discourse of terrorism plays a central
role in the Othering process by highlighting the culpability of the victims and downplaying other
factors” (152).
Within these contexts, the ways in which identities, inequality, and exclusion are framed
by the state and by Maoist leaders in India and Nepal have determined which people experienced
gross violations of human rights. In both countries, Maoist leaders argued they were fighting for
peasants and people belonging to historically marginalized caste and ethnic groups. In turn, state
violence targeted those populations regardless of their sympathies or alignments with Maoist
party leaders or combatants. In India, the state created, armed, and trained people for Salwa
Judum, or “the purification hunt,” which burned villages, raped women, murdered civilians, and
established holding camps in the name of fighting Maoist terrorists (Sundar 2016).
In Nepal, the government’s framing of Maoists as “terrorists” helped to garner
international support for state-led violence and military aggression that was typically directed
towards the most marginalized civilians. Significantly, the enactment of anti-terrorist legislation
in November 2001 and subsequent financial and logistical support from the U.S., U.K., and India
to “combat terrorists” coincides with the increase of state terror, especially enforced
disappearances, in Bardiya (Human Rights Watch 2004; OHCHR Report 2012). Members of the
Tharu community were disproportionately targeted by state violence and assumed, based on their
ethnicity, to be “terrorists.” Further, the Government of Nepal announced cash rewards for the
delivery of leaders of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, likely inspiring an escalation in
state violence as people were increasingly tortured by state security forces for information
(personal interviews). Subsequently, in Bardiya, as in other parts of the country, civilians were
taken from their homes, tortured, raped, killed, and disappeared by state forces (OHCHR Report
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2012). In the 2008 report, the OHCHR investigated 156 of the 200 reported cases of enforced
disappearances in Bardiya district, of which 14 were attributed to the Communist Party of NepalMaoist. State security forces were found responsible for the remainder of enforced
disappearances. Both in the proliferation of enforced disappearances in Bardiya by state security
forces and the violence enacted through Salwa Judum in India, they targeted civilians assumed to
be aligned with the Maoists based on their ethnicity.
However, Nepalis who supported the Maoists cannot easily be homogenized (Shah and
Pettigrew 2012), and the lived experience of conflict in Nepal was affected by numerous factors,
including the geographic location in which people found themselves, their age, caste or ethnic
group, gender, access to resources, political affiliation and their family’s historical ties and
relationships. Further, hierarchical expectations of social relations stratified by age, gender and
caste were transformed by Nepal’s conflict (Pettigrew 2001; Shah and Pettigrew 2012;
Shneiderman and Pettigrew 2004). For example, the Maoists encouraged the practice of
intercaste marriage, and Maoist cadres from the Dalit community entered “high”-caste
households, led fighting units and eschewed traditional restrictions regarding the sharing of food
and water (Gayer 2013). Yet, Pettigrew (2013) notes how during the armed conflict some
villagers in a Tamu-mai village in Nepal perceived the entry of people from the Dalit community
into their homes as a serious violation of caste norms and considered the practice the cause of
unfortunate events.
Moreover, gender norms were simultaneously challenged and reinforced through the
Maoist insurgency (Leve 2013; Parvati 2003a; Parvati 2003b; Shneiderman and Pettigrew 2004).
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist demanded, “patriarchal exploitation and discrimination
against women should be stopped” (40 demands as cited in Thapa and Sijapati 2004: 211).
Females served in leadership positions in the Maoist hierarchy, as section commanders and vice
commanders, and in all-female platoons (Parvati 2003a). However, regarding women’s
leadership in the Maoists, Comrade Parvati, the Central Committee Member and Head of the
Women’s Department of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, argued that male cadres resisted
surrendering “the privileged position bestowed on them by the patriarchal structure” (Parvati
2003a as cited in Shneiderman and Pettigrew 2004). Likewise, Pettigrew draws attention to how
Maoist cadres’ demands to stay in the homes of female villagers placed women in disempowered
positions (Pettigrew 2013). Further, conceptualizations of women’s empowerment by the
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Maoists are rooted in homogenizing rhetoric that does not accurately define all Nepali women,
particularly those outside of politically and economically dominant groups (Shneiderman and
Pettigrew 2004; Tamang 2002).
Additionally, the Maoists called for an end to inequality perpetuated through existing
power structures and an end to feudalism as perpetuated by the Nepali state. Maoist leaders
argued, “land should belong to tenants” and “land under the control of the feudal system should
be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless” (40 demands as cited in Thapa
with Sijapati 2004: 211). In Bardiya district, one of only two districts in Nepal where a majority
of the population identifies as Tharu, many conflict victims viewed the armed conflict as a
continuation of the struggle over land (Robins 2012). Additionally, many victims perceived
soldiers in the Nepal Army to be enforcers of the power arrangements that left the majority of
people from the indigenous Tharu community without access to resources, especially land, or
political representation (Ibid). Guneratne, based on his longitudinal research in Nepal, draws
attention to the dynamism of Tharu identity and the heterogeneity, specifically regarding access
to power and resources, language and religion, among people who identify as Tharu (Guneratne
2002). Yet, he indicates that Tharu identity is intimately tied to a shared history of
discrimination, exclusion and, as a result of national and international policies, the loss of land
(Ibid). Nepal is divided geographically by the Terai (plains along the southern border with India),
hills in the center, and mountains along Nepal’s northern border. The Terai, where Bardiya
district is located, is rich in natural resources, and elite members of the Tharu community utilized
the regions’ resources to build relationships with powerful leaders in the capital.
In the 1950s, with the encouragement of the leaders of the Nepali government and funded
by international aid, the Malaria Eradication Program was implemented in the Terai. Following
this program, “high”-caste Nepalis from the hills were encouraged by the state to move into the
Terai, which ultimately resulted in the loss of land for members of the Tharu community
(Guneratne 2002). Some “high” caste migrants exploited the existing kamaiya labor system,
resulting in extended bonded labor practices, increased indebtedness, and marginalization for
members from the Tharu community (Ibid). Within the Kamaiya labor system, established before
the mass migration to the Terai, a cultivator offers food, clothing and shelter to a laborer
(kamaiya) in exchange for labor. Yet, the traditional system occurred in a shared moral economy
where the cultivator and the laborer shared ethnicity, often kinship, and little difference in
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economic status (Ibid; Rankin 1999). Following the migration of “high” caste families to the
Terai, the kamaiya system was transformed into debt bondage with entire families tied to
dominant landlords socially removed from the Tharu community (Ibid). Tharu resistance to such
exploitative labor practices was curtailed by violence perpetrated by landlords and the police,
and, regarding the situation in Dang District, a report issued by a member of the Land Reform
Commission in 1954 argued “the Government Offices meant for providing Justice take the side
of the rich people and thus encourage further suppression of the poor” (Guneratne 2002: 98).
More people were forcibly disappeared from Bardiya than any other district in Nepal
during the armed conflict. What was previously defined as the Mid-Western Region of Nepal,
where Bardiya is located, is now commonly recognized as the region most affected by the
conflict in terms of gross violations of human rights. A 2008 publication by the UN Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) describes how members of the Tharu
community were targeted during the armed conflict:
Members of the Tharu indigenous group, who make up 52 % of the population in Bardiya
District, account for over 85 % of the persons disappeared by the State authorities in
cases documented by OHCHR. Among the victims [documented by OHCHR] were 123
men (including 102 Tharus), 12 women and 21 children. All the women and children
[disappeared] were of Tharu origin. Information provided to OHCHR leads to the
conclusion the majority of the disappeared were civilian villagers who were not CPN-M
[Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist] members at the time of arrest. Most of the victims
were farmers and others were labourers, students, teachers and carpenters. In addition to
their occupations, several were prominent Tharu activists. The Tharus constitute one of
the several indigenous groups that are historically marginalized and discriminated in
Nepal. Many of the disappeared that were not Tharu were also from economically
disadvantaged sectors of the population (OHCHR 2008: 6).
Robins (2011) contends the Nepal Army in the region had an interest in enforcing
traditional power relations and disposing of Tharu activists. Many perceived the conflict as a
continuation of a conflict over land between the Tharu community and “high” caste landlords
(Ibid). A 2008 OHCHR Report recognizes “the root of the conflict” and the high number of
enforced disappearances in Bardiya as connected to “issues of land distribution and lack of
access to economic resources for marginalized groups, as well as discrimination, lack of political
representation and lack of access to state services and protection” (OHCHR 2008: 7).
Since Nepal was united into a single kingdom in the 1700s, the Kathmandu Valley has
served as the economic and political center for the country leaving Nepalis living in rural
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villages to be excluded from access to resources and political power. When the armed conflict
began in 1996, poverty rates in rural Nepal were twice as high as urban areas (CBS, Poverty
Trends in Nepal 1995-1996). Inequality was exacerbated during the conflict, and by 2004, the
poverty rate in rural areas was more than three times higher than in urban areas (Ibid, 20032004). Although Nepalis in rural areas were excluded from political power and basic resources,
they were not spared from state violence before or during the armed conflict (Robins 2011, 2012;
Shneiderman 2003; Thapa, et al. 2012).
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Transitional Justice
The conflict officially ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by the
Nepal government and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist in 2006. The cessation of conflict
and the peace agreement ultimately emerged due to the rising unpopularity of the king,
Gyanendra. According to official reports, in June 2001, Prince Dipendra shot and killed King
Birendra, the Queen, and eight other members of the royal family. The king’s brother,
Gyanendra, then became king. It is widely speculated that King Gyanendra was involved in the
deaths of the royal family. Following the killings, the mainstream political parties continued to
support the monarchy. King Gyanendra dismissed parliament in 2002, and in 2005, dismissed
another government that he had appointed, imposed a state of emergency, arrested political
leaders, and established direct rule as the head of the government. This led the way for an
alliance of Nepali political parties, known as the Seven Party Alliance, to join with the Maoists
in peace negotiations and sign the 12-point understanding in India in November 2005. This, in
turn, was the basis for Jana Andolen II (People’s Movement II) in April 2006 when Nepalis
demonstrated for 19 days across the country calling for the cessation of armed conflict, the
restoration of democracy, and greater political and economic inclusion for marginalized groups.
As a result of the demonstrations, the king reinstated parliament and returned power to political
party leaders. Following the signing of the peace agreement in November 2006, the Maoists
became part of the Nepali government as an official political party. In this dissertation, when I
refer to the Nepali government or the Nepali state after the armed conflict, this is also inclusive
of the Maoist party. My interviewees also now see the Maoists as part of the state.
Nepal’s peace agreement is considered “revolutionary” in its explicit focus on economic and
social justice (Pasipanodya 2008: 385). It stipulates an end to discrimination “based on class,
ethnicity, language, gender, culture, religion, and region and to address the problems of women,
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Dalit, indigenous people, ethnic minorities (Janajatis), Terai communities (Madheshis),
oppressed, neglected and minority communities and the backward areas” and calls for
“socioeconomic transformation” and a restructuring of the state (CPA 2006).
Measures under the framework of transitional justice, normatively argued to facilitate justice
and reconciliation after the cessation of an armed conflict, were proposed in the peace agreement
as a means to redress conflict-era violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
In the peace agreement, both sides to the conflict agreed to make public the names and addresses
of people killed or disappeared during the conflict, provide information about the killed and
disappeared to their family members, create relief and rehabilitation programs for victims, and
establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In addition, both sides agreed impartial
investigations would be conducted and legal actions would be taken against those responsible for
rights violations. Concerning children, both sides agreed to “immediately stop all types of
violence against women and children,” and immediately rescue children affected and provide
appropriate assistance for their rehabilitation. Regarding the redress of violations specifically
affecting children, teachers, and education, the peace agreement states that the “right to
education to all should be guaranteed and respected…[and] the right to education should not be
violated… [and both sides] agree to immediately put an end to such activities as capturing
educational institutions and using them, abducting teachers and students, holding them captives,
causing them to disappear” (CPA 2006).
Despite a war that was fought on rhetoric espousing greater inclusion of marginalized
groups, women and conflict victims were noticeably absent during the signing of the peace
agreement. Powerful Nepali leaders have designed transitional justice processes, not as a postconflict means to redress conflict-era violations, but to escape prosecutions for war crimes.
Although Nepal’s government has remained unstable since the signing of the peace agreement,
the most powerful leaders to both sides of the conflict have maintained power since it’s
cessation. Further, scholars have drawn attention to how the mechanisms of transitional justice
proposed in the peace agreement (i.e. truth commissions) were imposed by international actors
and inappropriate for the Nepali context given the vulnerability and exploitation of the existing
judicial structure and likelihood that “reconciliation” would be utilized for political gain and as a
means to escape prosecution (Robins 2012; Sajjad 2013, 2016). For example, due to concerns
over the prosecutions of Maoist leaders that could result from the findings of a truth and
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reconciliation commission, Maoist leaders insisted on the establishment of a separate
disappearance commission due to the majority of disappearances being attributed to state
security forces (Sajjad 2013).
Further, as is typical, the role of international actors in human rights violations during
Nepal’s armed conflict was not acknowledged through the peace process. For example, although
the United States Department of State acknowledged the government’s dismal record of human
rights violations in its annual human rights report, the U.S. supported the monarchy and supplied
aid, equipment, and training to state security forces that was subsequently utilized in the killings
and disappearances of civilians. Yet, processes of transitional justice offer no form of
acknowledgement for international involvement in internal armed conflicts.
While victims’ groups have continually expressed concerns that the truth commissions
would be co-opted by powerful political leaders to ensure their escape from prosecutions,
international consultants, along with the peace secretariat, introduced the idea of creating two
truth-seeking commissions (Sajjad 2016). Thus, the commission envisioned in the peace
agreement, and finally established in 2015, has served as a performance of “justice” rather than a
commission to seek truth or ensure victims receive justice. Notably, the word “justice” was
removed from the section on the truth commission in final peace agreement as a result of
pressure from political party representatives. The only government-instituted comprehensive
mechanism of transitional justice enacted prior to the truth-seeking commissions, which were
established in 2015, was an Interim Relief Program established in 2008, awarding financial
compensation, medical treatment, scholarships, and/or vocational training for some victims.
Because the government refused to acknowledge complicity or express any form of regret
regarding conflict-era human rights violations and since the program was introduced as
humanitarian relief, the Interim Relief Program is not internationally recognized as a form of
reparations. Children were specifically targeted for scholarships through the Interim Relief
Program and were given priority in the Truth and Reconciliation Act and Rules. In Chapter 5, I
analyze the scholarship provision included in the Interim Relief Program, and in Chapter 6, I
examine Nepal’s truth seeking commissions.
Nepal has a long history of state-sanctioned and internationally aided inequality and
political violence, and the Maoists built the insurgency on the promise of uplifting marginalized
groups in Nepal, including lower caste groups, indigenous people, women, and children. Yet,
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despite the focus of the Nepali government on children in transitional justice policy and the focus
of the peace agreement on redressing systemic economic and social injustice, I argue that the
implementation of transitional justice mechanisms in Nepal not only failed to address victims’
needs, it entrenched ongoing inequality, state-centric nationalism (Lawoti and Hangen 2013),
and distrust in the national government.
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Chapter 4
Children, Locality, and Transitional Justice in Nepal7
Children are often cited as particularly vulnerable to, and, along with women, the most
affected by armed conflict (e.g. Impact of Armed Conflict on Children 1996; Parmar, et. al 2010;
UN Approach to Transitional Justice 2010). Yet, despite the emphasis in international law,
reports, and resolutions on their vulnerability and need for special protection during wartime
(e.g. CRC 1990; Geneva Conventions 1949 and two Additional Protocols 1977; UN Doc.
A/HRC/21/38 2012; ‘Security Council Resolution 1882,’ UN Doc. S/RES/1882 2009; ‘Security
Council Resolution 1612,’ UN Doc. S/RES/1612 2005), people who experienced gross violations
of human rights as children are rarely included in scholarly literature on transitional justice.
When children are included in scholarship on transitional justice, discourses typically surround
the reintegration and accountability of child soldiers (e.g. Parmar, et al. is the sole book
dedicated to broadly examining children and transitional justice). Further, within
conceptualizations of children and armed conflict, children within a nation-state, and often
globally, are frequently homogenized. This homogenization risks overlooking which children are
particularly vulnerable, in what context their vulnerability exposes them to gross violations of
human rights, and how their diverse positionality impacts their lives after an armed conflict.
Further, “childhood” is treated as a temporary vulnerability within international law that
presumably passes when a person reaches the age of 18. From birth until the age of 18,
international law (Convention on the Rights of the Child; Geneva Conventions and two
Additional Protocols) codifies humans’ special entitlements and additional protection during
armed conflict. Yet, transitional justice processes typically happen after an armed conflict has
ended, and, in many cases, several years after its cessation.
Although children in Nepal were victims of direct violence during the armed conflict,
including forced recruitment, abduction, torture, killing, maiming, disappearance and sexual
violence (OHCHR 2012), this chapter focuses on children of the unlawfully killed and forcibly
disappeared. Of the more than 12,000 people who were killed and 1,300 missing (Ibid), the
majority were men, and many of those men were fathers with multiple children. In Nepal, the
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An earlier version of this chapter was published in 2018 as “Intersectionality as Locality:
Children and Transitional Justice in Nepal” in the International Journal of Transitional Justice
12(1): 64-87.
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loss of a father carries severe and irreparable consequences for his children and entire family
throughout their lives. To date, no scholarly research has examined the perceptions and lived
experiences of the children of the unlawfully killed or disappeared during Nepal’s armed
conflict.
Focusing on the loss of a father illuminates how even for people who experience a similar
violation of human rights as children, their lives are dynamic and diverse. Victims’ diverse
identities and their ongoing transitions are often overlooked in transitional justice discourses.
Although the peace agreement was signed in 2006, during my fieldwork ten years later processes
of transitional justice were ongoing, and, in some ways, only beginning. This chapter examines
the perceptions of child victims of Nepal’s armed conflict who have since transitioned out of
what is recognized as a temporary phase in human lives known as “childhood” and are now,
according to international law, adults. Through examining their perceptions as adults, I argue
singling out biological age or any other singular characteristic or subjectivity as the critical
determinant of why and how a conflict victim experiences vulnerability risks ignoring how their
positionality correlates with differential experiences of both armed conflict and the transitional
period.
I begin with a review of scholarly literature examining children and armed conflict and “local
justice.” I contend homogeneous and fixed notions of “children” within discourses on
transitional justice fail to emphasize the transitions experienced in people’s everyday lives. Then,
I briefly review aspects of Nepal’s history of systemic exclusion and marginalization, and outline
my methodology. Next, I highlight children’s dynamic and diverse experiences during Nepal’s
armed conflict and explore the perceptions of Nepalis who were children when their fathers were
killed or disappeared during the armed conflict. Through examining their experiences and
ongoing transitions, I challenge homogeneous and fixed conceptualizations of “children” and
“the local” within the context of Nepal and argue for victim-led processes of transitional justice
and the redress of structural inequality.
Children and Armed Conflict
Overwhelmingly, scholarly literature posits that people who have experienced armed conflict
as children are traumatized and developmentally impaired (Barber 2009; Boyden and de Berry
2004). Further, UN agencies and international nongovernmental organizations defining and
assisting in the implementation of transitional justice measures often treat the constructed
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categories of “childhood” and “children” as static and universal. Thus, it is commonly taken for
granted that people who have grown up during armed conflict may respond and adapt to the
experience of political violence in a variety of ways (Boyden 2003; Kohrt and Maharjan 2009;
Nordstrom 2006). The complexity of their experiences may be overlooked when a singular focus
is placed upon the violations children have faced during armed conflict. As Boyden and de Berry
(2004:xv-xvi) contend, “The suffering of war is not contained in a single traumatic episode, or
even a multiplicity of such episodes, but in a complex interplay of detrimental circumstances that
endure and change over time.”
This complexity is important to analyze within the context of transitional justice as scholars
argue the varied experiences and positionalities of people affected by armed conflict as children
impact their perceptions of and adaptation to post-conflict environments throughout their lives
(Barber 2009; Boyden and de Berry 2004). The environment in which children live, as well as
their families, identities, communities, relationships and access to resources are all significant to
understanding their experiences of both wartime violations and processes of transitional justice.
Homogenizing children affected by armed conflict overshadows the ways in which their prewar
positionality creates conditions of vulnerability during armed conflict and differential lived
experiences during processes of transitional justice. Further, this homogenization fails to
highlight their resilience or ability to function despite having experienced gross violations of
human rights and their capability to actively participate in the design and implementation of
processes of transitional justice implemented on their behalf. Also often overlooked in
transitional justice discourses are how child victims survive and cope with the resources
available to them, how access to such resources is gendered or otherwise exclusive based on
social distinctions, and whether such conditions predate the transitional period and are pervasive
throughout its tenure.
Local Justice?
Based in international law and often implemented with the insistence of the UN and
international donors and diplomats, scholars examining transitional justice have critiqued
normative assumptions and emphasized the importance of understanding “local justice,” or the
ways in which justice is understood, produced, experienced and perceived in specific localities
(e.g. Hinton 2010; Shaw and Waldorf 2010). Particular attention has been given to how
transitional justice mechanisms are implemented in ways that are considered “top-down” or
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“elite-led” as opposed to “bottom-up” and “victim-centric” (LaPlante and Theidon 2007; Lundy
and McGovern 2008; Robins 2011, 2012; Wilson 2001). Within dialogues on the global/local in
transitional justice, encounters between “global mechanisms” and “local realities” are often
understood as ones of “friction” (Hinton 2010; Tsing 2005). As scholars and practitioners have
challenged global assumptions regarding transitional justice processes, “locality” has often been
conflated with nationality and presented as opposed to “the global” (Shaw and Waldorf 2010).
For example, in a report to the UN Security Council, Kofi Annan contends: ‘We must learn to
eschew one-size-fits-all formulas and the importation of foreign models, and, instead, base our
support on national assessments, national participation and national needs and aspirations’ (UN
Doc S/2004/616 2004: 1).
In Annan’s report, attention is drawn to the importance of a national context but not the
diversity of experiences within a nation-state. The conflation of the nation-state with “the local”
ignores historical and existing power structures and ongoing marginalization within a nationstate. This conflation can reinforce homogenizing and exclusionary nationalist rhetoric and
practices. Processes of transitional justice are often combined with liberal peacebuilding, and
significant financial and logistical support from international donors is utilized for the transition
of a nation-state from its previous form of government to a liberal democracy. The pervasive
liberal peace model focuses on individual citizens rather than communities and systemically
ignores structural causes of armed conflict and ongoing structural violence (Galtung 1969).
Within these contexts, support is state-centric and focused on rebuilding the nation through
constitution writing, elections and empowering national leaders, without challenging existing
hierarchies of power and inequality (e.g. Richmond 2002; Robins 2013). Existing scholarship
has illuminated how international influence over transitional justice processes imports and
reinforces unequal systems of power and marginalizes the voices of conflict victims (Ní Aolaín
2009; Wilson 2001). Further, scholars have drawn attention to how processes of transitional
justice are inescapably political (Hazan 2017) and highlighted how they are utilized or eschewed
by national governments as a nation-building project (Wilson 2001) and a geopolitical strategy
(Boehm 2017; Rowen and Rowen 2017). Within this model of post-conflict transition the
homogenization of victims serves to reinforce the nation-building project without addressing
ongoing structural violence.
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As greater attention has been paid to the importance of the context in which mechanisms
of transitional justice are implemented, scholars have challenged conceptualizations of “the
local” in human rights and transitional justice discourses. This scholarship has illuminated how
the binary global/local model can be teleological and analytically confusing (Goodale 2007),
emphasized that “the local” is always part of national and global processes (e.g. Betts 2005;
Hinton 2010), and indicated how conflating “the local” with “tradition” or “culture” can exclude
the knowledge, experiences and priorities of people in particular localities (e.g. Shaw and
Waldorf 2010). Further, interpretations of “the local” by those designing and implementing
transitional justice mechanisms are deeply embedded in existing structures of power and
inequality. Scholars and practitioners emphasizing attention to “the local” within processes of
transitional justice often fail to examine how experiences of armed conflict and transitional
justice differ within a nation-state. Ironically, while transitional justice is normatively understood
as a time of transition, or a liminal state for governments and societies, conceptualizations of
“the local” are often centered on customary law, rituals and cultural practices presented as
“traditional” (Burnet 2010; Wilson 2001) or primordial and “static” (Sajjad 2013).
Homogeneous and Static “Children”
Likewise, “children” are often presented as static in discourses on transitional justice. The
importance of children within processes of transitional justice is emphasized in scholarship and
policy, but people who have aged out of this category of vulnerability are frequently
subsequently disregarded. Does their experience of armed conflict as children influence their
lives as adults or does their vulnerability end when they age out of the internationally defined
category of childhood? Transitional justice policy, although predicated on an ideology of
transition, fails to respond to victims’ dynamic needs during the “transitional period.” When
policies are focused primarily on state institutions, such policies present a singular and solipsistic
set of criteria for understanding “transition” and ignore other kinds of transitions at work in
people’s everyday lives.
In Nepal, understandings of childhood are dynamic, diverse and not based solely on
biological age (e.g. Kohrt and Maharjan 2009; Snellinger 2009, 2013). Existing research has
illustrated how children are often perceived as transitioning into adulthood when they “become
responsible” and “mature” by getting a job, becoming physically developed, focusing on their
studies and understanding appropriate behavior (Kohrt and Maharjan 2009). Further,
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conceptualizations of childhood differ within Nepal and are perceived differently according to
gender and caste (Ibid), and understandings of childhood were challenged during Nepal’s
internal armed conflict (Pettigrew 2007). Children accepted the responsibilities of older family
members who had died or been conscripted as Maoist cadres, and children were feared as
possible Maoist informants (Ibid). Ten years after the signing of the peace agreement, most
Nepalis who experienced gross violations of human rights as “children” (as defined in
international law) had since transitioned out of that category. Further, the homogenization of
children during Nepal’s armed conflict ignores their diverse identities, dynamism and the
systemic marginalization and exclusion of certain groups based on their gender, religion,
language, ethnicity, caste and region of residence. As previous scholars have illuminated,
utilizing the national level as a unit of analysis to study armed conflict fails to capture people’s
lived experiences and obscures international complicity and other dynamics crucial to
understanding conflict, such as social, political, and economic factors (Drexler 2010; Lubkemann
2008, Shneiderman 2012; Thapa, Ogura, and Pettigrew 2012). Lubkemann (2008:28) argues
there was not a single Mozambican war, and “when cast as a socially homogenizing, rather than
socially informed, force, violence is inevitably operationalized at the largest scale of its
occurrence-typically the nation” and calls for greater attention to the social condition of war.
Transitional justice processes always take place within politicized structures and can
reproduce systems of power and privilege, and scholars have demonstrated how mechanisms of
transitional justice can be exclusionary to victims (O’ Rourke 2015; Sundar 2004; Robins 2012,
2013; Sajjad 2016; Wilson 2001). For example, processes of transitional justice often fail to
examine patriarchy and gendered experiences (Aguirre and Pietropaoli 2008; Ní Aoláin 2009; Ní
Aoláin and Rooney 2007). When gender is included in dialogues surrounding transitional justice,
descriptions easily slip from gender to women (Porter 2016; Hamber 2007). Further, women who
live through war and conflict cannot easily be homogenized (Simic 2016; Meintjes, et. al 2002).
Consequently, scholars have called for greater attention to the concrete ways in which multiple
inequalities are manifested simultaneously during armed conflict and in everyday life rather than
reducing women to a single story of victimhood (Bueno-Hansen 2010; Rooney 2007), and have
argued the interests of the most marginalized should be prioritized (Ní Aolaín 2009). Wilke
(2003:137) contends, “Complex identities matter not only because we need to represent identities
more carefully, or because current concepts of discrimination might be insufficient, but also
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because they are targeted and mobilized in state violence.”
This was certainly the case during Nepal’s armed conflict, where civilians were targeted
and mobilized based on intersecting facets of their identities. Both the Communist Party of
Nepal-Maoist and the Nepali government targeted people based on their age, gender, caste,
ethnicity, access to resources and region of residence. During my fieldwork, I heard many stories
of hardship and barriers due to structures of power and inequality. As I listened to people’s
stories and witnessed their lives, the complexity of the experiences and positionalities of people
who were children during the armed conflict was evidenced, as was their resilience. Their stories
of Nepal’s armed conflict and its aftermath cannot be reduced to one story of victimhood, and
the “local” in Nepal cannot be conflated with the entire nation-state. My research revealed
victims perceive their positionality as a primary cause of their experiences of human rights
violations. Scholars and practitioners of transitional justice must question why certain children
within a given nation-state experience gross violations of human rights and others do not. As
Paul Farmer (2004:7) has argued,
Human rights violations are not accidents; they are not random in distribution or effect.
Rights violations, are, rather, symptoms of deeper pathologies of power and are linked
intimately to the social conditions that so often determine who will suffer abuse and who
will be shielded from harm.
Likewise, Ní Aoláin and Rooney (2007: 347) contend, “gendered, social patterns of
suffering are linked to patterns of inequality that preceded conflicts.” In Nepal, social patterns of
suffering are linked to deeply entrenched patterns of inequality existent long before the armed
conflict.
Children’s Experiences During Nepal’s Armed Conflict
Scholarly literature and reports issued by non-governmental organizations, international
non-governmental organizations, and the UN emphasize children’s unique vulnerability during
Nepal’s decade-long internal armed conflict (‘Conflict in Nepal and It’s Impact on Children;’
HRW 2004; Pherali 2011; Subedi 2013; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/107 2006). Yet, many Nepalis
who were children during the armed conflict did not experience or even witness political
violence; others were raped, tortured, abducted by the Maoists, arrested by state security forces;
some endured the loss of multiple family members (personal interviews with conflict victims
January-December 2016; OHCHR 2012). Both the Maoists and the state security forces targeted
and mobilized children and their families based on their identities and subjectivities. In the
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context of Nepal, family dynamics, geography, gender, ethnicity, caste, access to resources and
political connections all determined which children suffered abuse or were shielded from harm.
Children in rural areas were more likely to witness and be affected by political violence than
children in Nepal’s capital, Kathmandu (OHCHR 2008, 2012). Dalits and members of
indigenous communities were disproportionately victimized and harassed by both government
forces and the Maoists (Goyal, et al. 2005; OHCHR 2012; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/107 2006).
Conversely, civilians with greater access to resources and from “higher”-caste groups historically
associated with positions of privilege and power were also particularly vulnerable during the war
due to their positionality (Amnesty International 1997; OHCHR 2012; Pettigrew 2013). From the
first day of the armed conflict, not only did the Maoists violently target buildings and people
associated with the state (e.g. police posts, administrative offices, loan documents in the
government-owned agriculture development bank), they also attacked wealthy landowners, who
were declared enemies of the party (OHCHR 2012). Pettigrew and Adhikari (2009) found the
Maoists targeted villagers who were better resourced (“people with large houses, guns, money,
and gold”) when asking for food and accommodations. This, in turn, placed those villagers at an
increased risk of being targeted by the Nepal Army, who were perceived as “trigger happy”
(Ibid). Interviews and conversations with people from marginalized caste and ethnic groups who
had access to resources and fled to Kathmandu during the armed conflict revealed how money
and political connections to various political parties, including both sides to the conflict, also
shielded some children and entire families from harm. Males were more likely to be killed or
disappeared during the conflict (OHCHR 2012). Yet, when women and girls were killed,
particularly by the Nepal Army, they were often raped first (Ibid).
There are discernible patterns of victimhood based on longstanding marginalization and
inequality revealed through the analysis of reports on Nepal’s armed conflict (Ibid; Goyal, et al.
2005, OHCHR 2008) further affirming the experience of armed conflict was not homogeneous
for children in Nepal. For example, poor girls from rural areas who were members of “low”caste or indigenous communities were more likely to be raped, killed or lose their fathers to
enforced disappearance or murder than “high”-caste boys living in Kathmandu (OHCHR 2008,
2012). However, Nepalis were not immune to harm perpetrated by either side to the conflict
based solely on their positionality. Being “high” caste or wealthy did not always protect Nepalis
from state violence. Likewise, although the Maoists claimed to be fighting on behalf of women,
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children, indigenous groups, “low”-caste groups and the poor, those subjectivities did not protect
Nepalis belonging to these categories from violence perpetrated by the Maoists.
In the next section, I examine the experiences and perceptions of Nepalis who were
children (according to international law) when their fathers were unlawfully killed or forcibly
disappeared during the armed conflict. Although they were younger than 18 years of age when
they lost their father, more than a decade has passed since the official end to the armed conflict.
Their narratives reveal commonalities and differences, demonstrating the incongruity of
conflating “the local” or “children affected by armed conflict” with the entire diverse nation of
Nepal.
Children whose Fathers were Killed or Disappeared
Regardless of their positionality, children whose fathers were killed or disappeared
during Nepal’s armed conflict faced considerable hardships. All the interviewees whose father
was killed or disappeared lived with their father’s natal family during the armed conflict, as is
the dominant practice in Nepal (see e.g. Tamang 2002 for the diversity of women’s experiences
outside of dominant practices). While broad generalizations about Nepali children are
inappropriate due to their tremendous diversity, regardless of their positionality, my interviewees
consistently mentioned the stigmatization of children who lost their fathers during the armed
conflict. The absence of their fathers forced them to endure stigmatization within their families,
communities and/or schools. Although all of the interviewees were part of family units that
consisted of siblings and a mother, they discussed being called “orphan” and “fatherless” by
teachers and fellow students at school and when walking in their villages.
Gender norms vary in Nepal, particularly by ethnic group. Yet, predominant patriarchal
norms in Nepal dictate that a child’s father determines belonging, both to the family and the
nation-state. The Citizenship Act of 1964 linked citizenship by descent solely to a child’s father.
This gendered notion of national belonging was reinforced through Nepal’s 2015 constitution,
which limits a mother’s ability to independently bestow citizenship to her children. For example,
the child of a Nepali mother and non-Nepali father can only acquire citizenship through
naturalization. Nepal’s constitution also stipulates that the child of a Nepali mother can obtain
citizenship by descent only if the child’s father cannot be traced. Thus, being Nepali is legally
tied to having a Nepali father.
Although male and female children were equally likely to lose their father during the
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armed conflict, their postwar experiences were highly gendered and the impact of the loss of
their father exacerbated by gender norms. In Nepal, dominant norms dictate that men are the
financial caretakers of their wives, children and elderly parents. The birth of a son is recognized
as a permanent family member within their natal household. Conversely, dominant norms dictate
that a daughter will reside with and take a dowry to her husband’s natal family. Although there
are multiple and complex variations on these practices throughout Nepal, the postwar
experiences of my interviewees were impacted by dominant gender norms predating the armed
conflict. Children’s experiences of losing their fathers during the conflict subsequently became
another aspect of their identities.
Likewise, interviewees discussed the stigmatization of their mothers who, following the
loss of their husbands, were harassed by the Maoists and/or state security forces, refused
assistance by government officials, stigmatized and called “widows,” “whores” and “old
women,” viewed as polluted in their communities, and treated as burdens by their in-laws. Wives
of the disappeared experienced additional distress and stigmatization due to their ambiguous
identities as neither wife nor widow (Robins 2011, 2012). Within these contexts, I heard
numerous stories of and witnessed everyday resistance to the stigmatization faced by the
interviewees and their mothers. Some interviewees’ mothers joined victims’ organizations,
rejected the label of “widow” and lived outside of their in-laws’ homes. As children, some
interviewees refused to stop attending school regardless of the stigmatization they faced by
fellow students and teachers. The stigmatization faced by conflict victims during and after the
armed conflict demonstrates how systems of patriarchy, caste-based and gender-based
discrimination, and other forms of systemic oppression and structural inequality, are reinforced
and contested in everyday life in Nepal.
For better-resourced interviewees who were able to relocate to Kathmandu, life in
Nepal’s urban center offered them an opportunity to escape the stigma they endured in their
villages. The urban space served, at times, to give them a sense of anonymity and separation
from reminders of the loss of their father. All interviewees perceived the loss of their father as
the cause of their inability to obtain greater access to education and financial resources, and they
associated their father’s death with his positionality, including his caste or ethnic group, access to
resources, residence and gender. The Transitional Justice Reference Archive (TJRA), which
documented violations of international law during Nepal’s armed conflict, and the 2012 OHCHR
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Nepal Conflict Report (citing the TJRA), attribute the majority of “unlawful killings” to the
Maoists and the majority of “enforced disappearances” to the government of Nepal (TJRA, as
cited in OHCHR 2012; OHCHR 2008). While some interviewees whose fathers were
disappeared clearly communicated distress due to their father’s ambiguous status and expressed
desires for a funeral ceremony and greater knowledge about the events related to his
disappearance, most interviewees stated they were certain their fathers had died during the armed
conflict. Despite this certainty, children of the disappeared faced additional difficulties. They
lamented their inability to acquire a death certificate and thus the necessary documentation to
receive citizenship and their father’s financial assets.
In conversations and semi-structured interviews with children of the disappeared from the
Tharu community in Bardiya, respondents expressed feeling that the state was anti-Tharu and
their ethnicity was the reason for their parent being targeted during the armed conflict. After the
conflict, females and males expressed their hardships as directly related to their own age and
gender, access to resources, and the difficulties associated with the loss of the male head of
household and primary breadwinner. Reema, a female member of the Tharu community,
described in the Tharu language the night her father was disappeared:
The police arrested my father when he was asleep. At midnight, I think it was 12 o’clock;
they arrested him and took him away…They [Nepal’s security forces and Nepalis who
are not members of the Tharu community] treat Tharu people bad wherever they go.
Speaking of the impact of her father’s disappearance, Reema continued,
It had a huge impact. We were small, and my mom was alone. The other family members
(paternal grandfather, paternal uncle and his wife) would not love us, since we were all
girls. [Because my father was disappeared], the police also tortured my
family…Sometimes, when money is scarce, I remember my father. Since father is not
there, people scold me. So, I feel sad. There is no male member, so they scold.
Reema, who was 19 at the time of the interview, spent her days helping her mother with
household chores and working outside the house. On a typical day, she cooked food, cut grass
and fed the goats her family received from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Reema said she was unable to complete her education due to the lack of resources at her school.
Because she was unable to educate her, Reema’s mother told me she planned to get Reema
married in the next year.
Male children faced other barriers, with the eldest son sometimes being expected to take
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on the role of the primary breadwinner. Juktilal, a male member of the Tharu community,
explained in the Tharu language:
He [my father] was arrested and then killed by the police. I was 10 or 11. My father was
the one who used to earn…So, on the one side, I had to earn, and on the other side, I had
to study. I had to look after the house. The eldest son had to bear the responsibility, so I
had to bear it…The responsibility of agriculture was on me. The responsibility to educate
my sister was on me, and all the responsibility to go to the field was on me. My mom
used to sell vegetables, and we used to raise goats and chickens and sell them.
Rather than viewed as a financial burden, his new positionality placed him in a crucial
and respected position in terms of his family’s survival. Juktilal told me that his father was Tharu
and killed by the police while he was traveling in a neighboring district. Juktilal said he had
heard from eyewitnesses that the police asked his father where he was from, and, after
responding that he was from a village in Bardiya, they killed him. The police, Juktilal assumed,
killed his father because he was a member of the Tharu community from Bardiya, and he
believed his father’s remains were in the jungle of a neighboring district. Both Reema’s and
Juktilal’s fathers are listed as missing by the ICRC. Female interviewees, including Reema,
commonly expressed feelings of physical and financial insecurity due to the loss of their fathers.
Reema and Juktilal were noticeably thin and expressed ongoing distress regarding their lack of
access to education and basic resources, including food. Further, they both expressed feeling as if
they were doubly stigmatized for being Tharu and viewed as fatherless.
Although state security forces targeted members of the Tharu community due to their
ethnicity, they were not excluded from violence perpetrated by the Maoists. Sumitra, a 21-yearold female interviewee from the Tharu community in Bardiya, described the day her father was
abducted and killed by the Maoists. Sumitra’s father supported the Nepali Congress Party, a
political party associated with the Nepali government during the armed conflict, and opposed the
Maoist insurgency. She expounded in the Tharu language,
[The Maoists came in our house at night and] took my father saying, ‘we have some
work.’ Immediately after that, they locked the door and said, ‘we will cut you, kill you.’
They locked the door, so that we could not go outside. They turned off the lights, and at
that time, there was no light. After ten or fifteen minutes, [upon mom’s insistence], we
came out breaking the door. We all started to search for my father walking in different
directions, but he was taken away from the main road. We asked for help, but nobody
came. Later, we knew the Maoists had threatened the villagers that if they helped, they
would be shot and killed. We searched but could not find my father. Five minutes after
we reached our home, we heard the gun shot. Then, we started crying thinking that our
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father is no more. Where to go for searching my father? Even then, we started to search…
After the murder, we searched but could not find him…My father’s sister came to our
house and informed us [he was dead], and we all started crying. We left for the place
where the dead body was placed, and we saw blood spots on the road. Then we knew my
father was killed. We ourselves carried him. Nobody helped.
Sumitra’s mother said when she attempted to receive help from the Nepal Army after her
husband’s death, she was turned away, “kicked” and “scolded.” Despite her husband’s
opposition to the Maoist insurgency, Sumitra’s mother’s gender and ethnicity delayed her ability
to acquire assistance from state forces. Sumitra described being called an orphan at school by
students and teachers and detailed how fellow villagers refused to let her mother touch their food
for fear of bad luck. When I interviewed Sumitra, she and her mother continued to face
stigmatization as members of the Tharu community, as females in a home without male
members, and as victims of the Maoists in a majority Tharu village where most victims of
Nepal’s armed conflict were victims of state security forces. As a result, Sumitra lamented how
other victims in the village failed to communicate information about any programs implemented
to assist conflict victims due to their perceptions of her. Although he had left the village,
Sumitra’s brother sent money to their mother. In addition, Sumitra and her mother received a
small income from their occasional work in the village and harvested their own food.
People who are considered privileged by Nepali standards were also targeted during the
armed conflict based on their positionality. The Maoists targeted civilians based on their aboveaverage access to resources, education level and associations with people in positions of
influence and power (OHCHR 2012; Pettigrew 2013). The leader of a national victims’ group
suggested I talk to Sunil. I called him, and he asked me to meet him at a popular bus park in
Kathmandu. Sunil arrived on his motorcycle, and we went to a restaurant nearby. As I sat across
from him at the restaurant, I noted his appearance. I guessed Sunil was around 5’10” and
weighed about 200 pounds. He wore what looked like new clothes: a plaid button-up shirt, blue
jeans and black tennis shoes with a large silver watch. As we waited for momos (dumplings),
drinking Sprites, I asked him to tell me about his family. He said in English,
I am born in a middle class family, me, myself, brothers and two sisters. When I was 12, I
lived in [a district outside of Kathmandu]. My father was a teacher and master of a
government school. My mother was a housewife. She is a social worker, too, an educated
woman in my village. In our village, my family is educated in comparison with other
families, because it is a rural area.
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As we continued talking, he also said his family was very respected in their village due to
their “high”-caste status as Brahmins and level of education. Sunil explained that his family had
greater access to financial resources than other families in his village. He believed his father was
targeted due to these factors.
The terrorists of the Nepal Government (Maoists) killed my father when I was 12. My
brother was in Kathmandu at that time. Mother had made food for us that night, and we
had guests in our home. We were having dinner when two people called my father. They
said they had some work with him. I said, ‘I want to come with father,’ but they said,
‘you are too small, you cannot come,’ and I cried. My mother was awake, waiting for him
the whole night, but he did not come back. I also did not sleep till 11 or 12. My mother,
early in the morning the next day, went to another village searching for my father, but she
did not find him. Then me, my father’s brother, and [my] sister went near from our land,
and I saw my father’s dead body, and I cried, and the villagers came. They killed my
father because he was educated. Villagers used to follow what he said and respected him.
So, the Maoists might have thought if they kill my father, everyone will be in their
power.
As Sunil and I continued to talk, he described aspects of his life after his father’s death.
Like Reema, Juktilal and Sumitra, he and his family began to face stigmatization in their village.
Yet, unlike Reema’s, Juktilal’s and Sumitra’s families, Sunil’s family had access to resources to
leave the village. Because Sunil was male, he was sent out of the village within a year for better
educational opportunities while his sisters remained in the village. When Sunil was 13, he moved
to Kathmandu, lived with his maternal uncle and attended private school. His entire nuclear
family eventually left the village, with one brother working in the US, another brother and his
mother living together in Kathmandu, and his sisters living with their husbands in other cities in
Nepal. His family, he said, continues to own land and a house in his natal village. Like many
conflict victims who relocated to Kathmandu during the armed conflict, Sunil utilized his change
of residence as a means to escape the social stigma related to his father’s death and took
advantage of the increased educational and employment opportunities available in the capital.
Sunil was 28 at the time of the interview and had just completed the coursework for his
bachelor’s degree in management. He is currently running his own non-governmental
organization in Kathmandu.
Other interviews with Nepalis whose fathers were killed or disappeared complicated
common narratives of the armed conflict and further emphasized the need for attention beyond
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homogeneous conceptualizations of victims in processes of transitional justice. Sumedh, who
was 25 years old and residing in Kathmandu at the time of the interview, described his family’s
positionality within their village (in a district outside of Kathmandu) and how he thought it was
related to his father’s disappearance by the Nepal Army. He specified in Nepali,
Our family was rich at that time [during the conflict], because we are Brahmin caste. In
Brahmin caste, all people respect us. My grandfather was a landlord and was an
intellectual person in the village. My father was also an intellectual person. We owned
lots of land. In the village, we were rich among other people. Then that was good. At that
time [during the conflict], my father and my brother were taking a bus to Kathmandu. I
was 12 years old and studying in class 6, and my brother was studying in 8 class. At that
time, the Army force was searching buses and people’s bags on the way to the next
district. In my father’s bag, he had lots of documents and money. He had around 50,000
to 80,000 rupees (US$500–$800), and they [the Army] asked him why he had lots of
money. They arrested him. They said to my brother, ‘in the evening, we will return your
father.’ They said that, but they didn’t return him. My father was a normal person. He
was not involved in any political party. When my mother, brother, and grandmother went
to the Army barracks and asked why he was arrested, a person came out and scolded my
family and beat them with pipes.
Although they had greater access to resources and were “high” caste, the positionality of
Sumedh’s family did not protect them from state violence during the armed conflict. Yet, his
family’s wealth provided him with the resources to complete his master’s degree after the
disappearance of his father.
Although the data presented in this chapter correlate caste status and access to financial
resources, they cannot be conflated. In Nepal, being higher caste does not necessarily mean
having greater access to resources. Likewise, belonging to the Tharu community does not
necessarily indicate a family’s financial standing. However, access to resources in Nepal is
correlated with historical patterns of exclusion and marginalization. All the interviewees in this
chapter perceived the loss of their father as connected to their family’s positionality and
described similar experiences of stigmatization. Most interviewees’ access to education and basic
resources following the loss of their fathers depended on preexisting conditions of hierarchy,
marginalization and their families’ access to resources.
Reema, Juktilal, Sumitra, Sunil and Sumedh all emphasized that continuing their
education was very important. In Nepal, the School Leaving Certificate (SLC) is known as “the
iron gate.” Failing the SLC prevents many students from advancing from grade 10 to what is
referred to in Nepal as “plus two” (grades 11 and 12). Completing “plus two” is a necessary step
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to go on to post-secondary education in Nepal. The disparity in the SLC pass rate between
students who attend public school and those who attend private school is remarkable. According
to the District Education Office in Bardiya, the SLC pass rate for children attending public
schools is 22 percent, while children in private schools have an 85 percent pass rate. Nepal’s
national discrepancy in the SLC pass rate for public and private school attendees is almost
identical to the situation in Bardiya district, with slight annual variations. Reema, Juktilal and
Sumitra all attended public school in Bardiya. Sunil and Sumedh attended private school in
Kathmandu. Despite Juktilal’s increased responsibilities as the eldest male in his family, he
passed his SLC and was able to complete his “plus two.” Juktilal was among a minority of
students, regardless of the experience of losing his father, who attended public school and passed
the SLC. Yet, Juktilal, 27 at the time of the interview, was, at that point, unable to continue to
postsecondary education due to family obligations and a lack of financial resources. Sumitra also
passed her SLC and started pursuing her bachelor’s degree. However, poor health and lack of
access to sufficient resources, including healthcare, prevented her from attending classes. All the
interviewees prioritized education, but their varied positionalities determined their access and
ability to pursue educational opportunities.
Although they were all younger than the age of 18 and considered “children” according
to international law when they experienced a gross violation of human rights, their age at the
time of the violation, gender, education level, access to resources, birth order, family support (or
lack thereof) and caste or ethnic group have affected their lives during the “transitional period.”
Reema was not opposed to prosecutions. Juktilal stated explicitly he would like the police who
killed his father to be prosecuted. However, in their interviews, they both prioritized access to
education and basic resources. Sumitra said the most important needs of conflict victims were
education and access to jobs and also expressed an explicit desire to see the people responsible
for her father’s death punished. Conversely, Sunil emphasized a desire to receive “firstly, the
reason of my father’s murder and punishment of the wrong doer [who killed my father], and
secondly, support for my family and my further studies.”
Yet, processes of transitional justice often fail to acknowledge victims’ differential
experiences, needs and perceptions within a nation-state. When I asked him how he felt when his
family received money from the Nepal government as relief for his father’s disappearance,
Sumedh said, “We are not happy. We don’t need money. We need our father.” As Sajjad
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(2016:30) has argued, “identification of the homogeneous victim in need of salvation primarily
through financial assistance has been a consistent but oversimplified theme in Nepal.” Despite
Robins’ (2011: 85-86), argument that “the needs of victims’ families are not static” and his
finding of “dramatic differences” in victims’ perceptions of justice based on their positionality,
transitional justice policies in Nepal have framed children affected by armed conflict as static
and homogeneous.
Reema, Juktilal and Sumitra all viewed the postconflict national government as antiTharu. While caste and class cannot be conflated, government-supported suppression of the
Tharu community is linked to their significantly lower access to resources, particularly land.
After the loss of their fathers, Reema, Juktilal and Sumitra were all expelled from their fathers’
natal homes. This was due not only to entrenched systems of patriarchy where a child’s father
marks their own familial belonging but also to their paternal family’s lack of access to resources.
Conversely, Sumedh’s paternal grandparents had acquired sufficient wealth before his father’s
disappearance to maintain their survival in his absence, and it was Sunil’s maternal family that
ensured his access to higher education in Kathmandu. For Sunil and Sumedh, leaving their
villages and residing in the nation’s capital also provided them the anonymity to escape social
stigma. Although Sunil and Sumedh benefited from existing hierarchies, they both explicitly
indicated their desires for, and were actively working towards, more equitable access to
resources for marginalized populations. While being male, “high” caste and having access to
resources could not mitigate the emotional or financial impact of losing their fathers, their
prewar positionality determined their access to resources after the war. Even within the same
nuclear family, gender norms determined access to education. Additionally, despite their
positionality, Sunil and Sumedh expressed feeling marginalized and disconnected from the
national and international political elites determining transitional justice policies and
implementation.
The postwar differential experiences between victims are microcosms of larger systems
of structural inequality. Although victims in Nepal come from diverse positionalities, the vast
majority lack access to political power and are excluded from decisions about processes of
transitional justice implemented on their behalf. Since the signing of the peace agreement,
international and national elites have dominated transitional justice processes and privileged the
promulgation of the constitution and national elections over redressing conflict-era violations
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and ongoing structural violence. The peace agreement called for social and economic justice
after the war. Yet, structural violence continues to impact the lives of children throughout Nepal,
who face inequitable access to education, healthcare and food. Higher education was a key
concern and desire for all of my interviewees, but structures of inequality systemically prevented
some victims from continuing their education. When I asked interviewees why they wanted to
pursue higher education, they linked education to dignity, jobs and greater access to resources.
Regardless of their positionality, they felt disempowered by the loss of their fathers and excluded
from what they viewed as elite-led processes of transitional justice. Activists and scholars have
argued for greater inclusion of victims in processes of transitional justice in Nepal and spoken
out against the orchestrated dependence of victims on elite-led national and international
agencies to speak on their behalf (Robins and Bhandari 2012). Examining child victims’ diverse
and dynamic experiences reveals the need for the transformation of hierarchies of power,
domination, and exclusion.
Conclusion
The narratives of people who lost their fathers during Nepal’s armed conflict suggest
locality cannot be conflated with nationality. Rather, analyses of victims’ perceptions and
everyday lives illuminate the complexity and dynamism of the experience of victimhood for
children. All victims of Nepal’s armed conflict, regardless of positionality, deserve equal access
to justice (however they conceptualize and prioritize the concept).
It is important to examine what actually changes through processes of transitional justice.
I argue for greater attention to the transitions occurring in people’s everyday lives. Yet, also
unexamined or redressed through transitional justice processes are entrenched systems of power
and inequality. The homogenization of victims suppresses attention to and the redress of the
structural inequalities intimately tied to Nepal’s armed conflict. So long as powerful elite actors
drive transitional justice processes without prioritizing victims’ inclusion, acknowledging
victims’ diversity, and redressing structural inequality, what meaningful transition will occur?
Hierarchies of power can be shifted to empower conflict victims. Recognizing hierarchies
among victims does not preclude their ability to design inclusive victim-centric processes of
transitional justice. As Gready and Robins (2014) argue, scholars and practitioners must ask how
they can create space for locally led solutions and then provide the requested resources to aid and
empower conflict victims to implement their own processes. “Local justice” must move beyond
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essentialism and nationalism, and, further, redress entrenched systems of domination and
inequality. When oppression, marginalization, and deep-seated inequality are recognized as
significant factors to an armed conflict, the refusal to redress such conditions is sure to entrench
them.
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Chapter 5
Scholarships for “Children Affected by Armed Conflict”
“Parents don’t know the significance of education for their child. That is the main thing.”
I was at the district education office sitting next to Balkrishna, an education officer, government
official, and gatekeeper of scholarship implementation in Bardiya district. As Balkrishna was
explaining to me the reason why children in Bardiya fail or drop out of school, it struck me as
ironic that he was simultaneously signing forms brought in by parents to be reimbursed for their
children’s school snacks. He sat behind his desk dressed in a clean suit as he was signing forms
one after the other and then dismissing the parents-mothers and fathers whose clothes were worn
and hands were rough, presumably from agricultural work.
In my conversations and interviews in Bardiya district, I heard over and over again how
important education was for individuals and their entire families. I thought back to the day I sat
outside across from Pradesh, a young man from the Tharu community whose father was
disappeared by the Nepal Army, as he took a break from working in the field. To my question,
“what were the effects of your father being taken?” he responded, “The effect is that I didn’t get
a chance to study in school.” He continued, “The basic need of the conflict victims’ families is
that their children should get a chance to study up to intermediate level.” When talking about his
hopes for the future, he said, “I am ready to remain hungry, but I will make my children
educated.”
Pradesh’s emphasis on education being both one of the most significant consequences of
the armed conflict and one of his family’s greatest needs was common for victims that I spoke
with in both Bardiya and Kathmandu. Yet, access to education before, during, and after the
armed conflict varied significantly for victims of Nepal’s armed conflict. In the last chapter, I
argued transitional justice policy often homogenizes victims and fails to responds to their diverse
and dynamic needs during the transitional period. Concomitantly, I showed how life transitions
for those affected by conflict as children are simultaneously homogenized by the static category
of “childhood.” In this chapter, I examine the meanings that victims and their families in Bardiya
assigned to education and their experiences of inequitable access to scholarships targeting
“conflict affected children” as part of Nepal’s Interim Relief Program. I begin the next section
with a conversation I had with one of my friends in Bardiya that illustrates a common narrative
about the historical significance of education and how education (or lack of) is utilized to explain
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inequality according to caste, ethnicity, gender, and other identities. I argue that discourses of
knowing/not knowing are instrumental in the concealment of power and the perpetuation of
marginalization and structural inequality in Nepal. Through examining the scholarship provision
for “conflict affected children,” I contend the barriers conflict victims in Bardiya experience
trying to access scholarships demonstrate not only that structural inequality still exists during the
“transitional” period but also that the state is committed to maintaining it.
(Lack of) Education and (Not) Knowing as Proxy
On a temperate day in February in a rural village in Bardiya, my friend Arita and I were
sitting together looking out at a rice field. She explained to me, “there is tension between the
landlords and the Tharu, because they illegally took Tharu land and took advantage of them.
Tharu people didn’t understand the documents they were signing, because they could not read.”
Arita, 22 at the time and a member of the Tharu community, was explaining this to me in
English. She was educated in English medium schools in Kathmandu, as was her father. She
described what she perceived as the historical and ongoing intention of powerful political leaders
to marginalize people from the Tharu community by deceiving them, and she described “Tharu
people” as “unsuspecting,” “simple, “and “backward.” Although she and her father had been
educated in Kathmandu and both spoke English fluently, she attributed the financial losses of her
paternal grandfather to his trust of others and not being formally educated. She said,
Many people have taken advantage of my grandfather, and they have convinced him to
give them his money. One time a man came and stayed with my grandfather for a couple
days and convinced him to put a tractor in his name, and my grandfather did it. Then, he
was making payments for a long time in someone else’s name. The payments were not
always being counted, because the person taking the payments was not recording that
they were receiving the money. My grandfather spent all this money and lost the tractor,
because it was in this other person’s name…That is why my father wanted to become
educated, things like this.
In conversations with people inside and outside the Tharu community, and in Nepali
books explaining Tharu people, the community’s “backwardness” and “simplicity” were
described, typically in the same conversation/book, both as primordial and as due to their lack of
education (i.e. formal schooling).
In the context of Nepal’s armed conflict, discourses about knowing, consciousness, and
education hold significant meanings. On one hand, “Nepalis who participated in the Maoist
movement were often represented [by Western observers and the Nepali elite] as victims of a
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sort of false consciousness, or worse, of no consciousness at all” (Shneiderman 2012: 67). On the
other hand, lack of education/not knowing has long been an explanation of
inequality/marginalization (e.g. the Tharu exploitation by more educated, literate landlords), and
teaching basic literacy has been utilized by Nepali activists seeking to build political
consciousness, for example, among Thangmi villagers (Shneiderman 2013) and as a platform for
building a movement against exploitative landlords through educating the Tharu (Guneratne
2002). Guneratne argues that the conceptualization of “Tharus as a backward group, illiterate and
therefore underprivileged, is an important organizing symbol of their identity” (2002: 194). It is
around this central narrative of exploitation by educated, “not simply landlords” but by highcaste hill people “in unambiguously ethnic terms” that elite Tharu leaders began organizing
members of the Tharu community in the 1950s for greater access to political power and
resources (Guneratne 2002). In his research on the making of the Tharu identity in Nepal,
Guneratne found that members of the Tharu Welfare Society
like Tharus in general, believe that it is through education that the welfare of the Tharu
may be assured. The catalyst for the founding of the [Tharu Welfare Society] was the
perception that the Tharu were backward, and the necessity to make their status equal to
that of other castes (jat). The causes of this backwardness was identified as the general
illiteracy of the Tharu, which made them vulnerable to exploitation by other groups, and
the consequent inability of the Tharu to produce the doctors and engineers who, by virtue
of their professional status, might raise the status of the group as a whole. Education has
been seen as the means by which a “backward” society may be transformed to a
“forward” status (Guneratne 2002:139-140).
Ironically, the education of some elite members of the Tharu community in India, along with
development agencies reinforcing ideas of villagers as backward and uneducated, contributed to
social constructions of marginalized groups in Nepal as ignorant (Guneratne 2002; Pigg 1992,
1995). In Pigg’s 1992 study of the introduction of development discourse into Nepali
communities, she argues that such introductions frame the direction of progress from rural to
urban and alter what it means to be a villager. She contends,
The “ignorance” of villagers is not an absence of knowledge. Quite the contrary. it is the
presence of too much locally-instilled belief…The problem people working in
development will tell each other and a foreign visitor, is that villagers “don’t understand
things.” To speak of “people who don’t understand” is a way of identifying people as
“villagers.” As long as development aims to transform people’s thinking, the villager
must be someone who doesn’t understand (Pigg 1992: 17, 20).
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In Nepal, education is utilized as a marker of social status and is measured by phrases to
describe people, such as “educated,” “uneducated,” “backward,” statements like “she
could/could not write her name,” and the answers to a common question utilized to mark status,
“up to how far have you studied?” including “up to class ___,” “SLC pass,” “plus two,”
“bachelor’s.” Formal education (i.e. schooling) in Nepal has a long history of being a marker of
social standing and access to resources. Every parent I met in Nepal, regardless of any aspect of
their positionality, prioritized formal education (i.e. schooling) for their children. For both male
and female conflict victims, education was explained in interviews and conversations as means
of upward mobility through a greater chance at employment, and thus income and resources.
Yet, in the same interviews and conversations, people would describe how jobs in Nepal are
acquired through nepotism, lament how there are no jobs in Nepal, and discuss the advantages of
seeking employment outside of the country.
While it is connected to aspirations for greater economic opportunities, being an educated
person holds additional meanings and value. To be an ‘educated person’ in Nepal is associated
with dignity and perceived higher social standing. Previous scholars have argued
conceptualizations of the ‘educated person’ influences expectations for formal education to be
transformative in Nepal (Levinson and Holland 1996) and found that young people view learning
the Nepali language in school as necessary for them to “make their way in the world” (Noonan
1996: 5) while learning English was a means to reach a “world of promises and new
opportunities” (Valentin 2011:110; also see Caddell 2006; Liechty 2003; Pradhan 2016). Rather
than viewed strictly as a stepping stone for personal achievement, existing scholarship has
illuminated how students also view education as way to help develop the nation and be of service
to their communities (Fujikura 2003; Skinner and Holland 1996; Snellinger 2016).
Yet, education in Nepal has always been exclusionary and connected to elite power.
Under Rana rule (1846-1950), only the ruling elite were permitted by the state to be formally
educated. Following the end of Rana rule and the implementation of multi-party democracy in
the 1950s, schools were established throughout the country, including elite private schools
predominantly run by missionaries in Kathmandu (Caddell 2006). During the Panchayat era
(1960s-1990s), homogenous nationalist discourse was strongly promoted by the state through the
slogan ek bhasa, ek dharma, ek bhes, ek desh (one language, one religion, one form of dress, one
country). While schools were nationalized in the 1960s and 1970s and accompanied by
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nationalist curricula, donors, including the World Bank, encouraged the decentralization of
education in the 1980s, and private schooling proliferated in the 1990s (NESAC 1998:87 as cited
in Caddell 2006). Caddell (2006) argues, the dream of educational opportunity expanded in
Nepal [in the 1990s] due to optimism that multi-party democracy would lead to greater equality
and inclusion, and as she contends, significantly, “with educational opportunities opened to all
through the expanded government school system, the search for ways of differentiating
achievement intensified” (468).
The bar of achieving status as an “educated person” was raised when marginalized
communities gained greater access to education; a significant marker of social status in Nepal is
now attending private school, especially elite English-medium schools (Caddell 2006; Liechty
2003). As public education became more accessible, the liberalization of the education market
and the proliferation of private schools ensured that Nepalis with the greatest access to resources
retained or increased such resources. The proliferation of formal schools in Nepal has, rather
creating equal opportunities for historically marginalized groups, entrenched hierarchies of
power and inequality. Scholars have criticized the influence of donors, such as the World Bank,
for the continued exclusion of marginalized groups from and through education. For example,
Mikesell (1993:32) argues, schooling in Nepal is
an imposition onto the village communities of an alien system of knowledge, priorities,
values and methods evolved from Western colleges of education. Classroom discipline,
examinations and certification authoritatively determine what is "true knowledge," and
devalue the knowledge, practices and languages of the villagers... An immense class of
people is presently being schooled in Nepal to despise their own rural background.
An explicitly stated intention of formal education in the 1990s was to promote an
attachment of youth to a developing Nepali nation (Fujikura 2003), develop democratic
institutions, and foster democratic attitudes and values in children to promote nation-building
(Carney and Bista 2009). Pherali (2011:144) argues,
The process of forming ‘a uniquely Nepalese identity’ permeated the concept of the
modern national education system, which largely denied the existence of ‘a dynamic
tension with regional and ethnic identities’ undermining the significance of indigenous
language and culture (Pigg 1992: 497). Educational provision for Janajati (tribal) or
Aadibasi (indigenous) children was often non-existent since Nepali, the medium of
teaching and learning at schools, was not often their mother-tongue and the curricula
were often too ‘foreign’ to engage with… Even in 2001, a full decade after multiparty
democracy was restored, equal rights were spelled out in the new Constitution, and
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educational ‘development’ efforts intensified, literacy rates among Brahmins, the socalled upper caste, were 70% as compared with a dismal 10% among the several lowstatus caste groups (Central Bureau of Statistics 2003). This was a failure of externally
led development to address the country’s most pressing social problems.
Thus, following the establishment of multi-party democracy in the 1990s, education in Nepal
served to contribute to a façade of democracy and equality while systemically ensuring the
continued marginalization and poverty of the majority. Although he contends that Nepal’s
education system was both alien and alienating, Fujikura (2003) argues the Maoists built on the
nationalist rhetoric promoted through formal education to produce alternative visions of nationbuilding and progress through armed struggle.
Education and Nepal’s Armed Conflict
Schools were critical sites during Nepal’s armed conflict. Scholars have described
education in Nepal as “one of the main causes of the violent conflict” (Pherali 2011: 135) and as
schools as “battlefields” (Caddell 2006). The Maoists used schools as hideouts, to conduct
cultural trainings, and to recruit and abduct children for conscription into the People’s Liberation
Army (Subedi 2013; Shneiderman and Turin 2004; van Wessel and van Hirtum 2013). Teachers
and principals were also specifically targeted by the Maoists and often abducted, mutilated, and
killed (Pherali 2011). For the Maoists, teachers were targeted both as community leaders capable
of influencing the population and as a source of income. Many teachers who refused to provide
money or otherwise comply with the demands of the Maoists were mutilated or killed. United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO 2010) reported the Maoists
abducted 21, 998 students and 10, 621 teachers between 2002 and 2006.
Likewise, the Nepali government sought support from teachers, and teachers suspected of
supporting the Maoists were arrested, tortured, and killed by state forces (Ibid). Schools were
used as army barracks (OHCHR Nepal Conflict Report 2012) and targeted by state forces if
Maoist gatherings were conducted in or around school buildings (Amnesty 2005; ACHR 2005).
Children suspected of supporting the Maoists were arrested, raped, tortured, and killed by state
forces (OHCHR Nepal Conflict Report 2012). As a result, children feared attending school due
to the threat of arrest, abduction, torture, killing, and enforced disappearance by both sides to the
conflict. Additionally, many people who were killed or declared missing had children, some of
which witnessed the abduction or arrest of their parent.
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As described in the previous chapter, the majority of Nepalis killed or declared missing
during the conflict were men, and most were the sole breadwinner in their family. The loss of a
male head of household during the conflict had severe economic consequences for their parents,
wives, and children. Such children were often forced to discontinue their education, seek
additional employment, take on additional childcare and household chores, and faced
stigmatization in their communities where fathers were viewed as protectors of safety and
dignity. Nepal’s peace agreement explicitly calls for an end to capturing educational institutions
as well as the cessation of holding students and children captive and causing them to disappear
(2006).
Scholarships for “Children Affected by Armed Conflict”
With $23 million of a $50 million grant from the World Bank, the Government of Nepal
implemented an Interim Relief Program in 2008 and included a scholarship provision for
“children affected by armed conflict” (Carreza 2012). Yet, the state constructed victimhood so
that not all Nepalis who experienced gross violations of human rights as children were included
in the program. The scholarship policy included children who experienced a disability as a result
of the armed conflict and children whose parents were killed, disappeared, or experienced a
disability as a result of the conflict. Nepal’s Interim Relief Program is not considered reparations
according to international standards due to the state’s failure to acknowledge responsibility.
Rather, the interim relief policy was framed as humanitarian aid or economic assistance intended
to provide temporary relief until truth commissions were established and a reparations program
was implemented. Scholars have argued for the potential of victim reparations to aid in social
and political inclusion (De Greiff 2006; García-Godos 2013) and serve as symbolic
acknowledgements of structural violence (LaPlante and Theidon 2007). However, I argue the
only semblance of financial reparations implemented since the signing of the peace agreement
(i.e. the Interim Relief Program) has served to safeguard the continued exclusion of the most
marginalized people who experienced gross violations of human rights as children.
In countries undergoing processes of transitional justice, scholars have drawn attention to
the politics of victimhood (Bernath 2016; Druliolle 2015; McEvoy and McConnachie 2012;
Sajjad 2016; Wilson 2001) and illuminated how “notions of victimhood are produced, contested,
negotiated, adapted and neglected in the context of processes of power-driven social interaction
that depend on specific social, economic and political conditions” (Waardt 2016:18).
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Determinations of victimhood may be based on perceptions of innocence (McEvoy and
McConnachie 2012), ongoing political divisions (Druliolle 2015), or a hierarchy of violations in
need of redress (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:1-2). The determination of victimhood is
the starting point of processes of transitional justice aimed to redress human rights violations and
is crucial for the implementation of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. In Nepal, elite actors
have determined which violations are worthy of redress through the Interim Relief Program, thus
conferring victim status to some while systemically excluding many people who experienced
gross violations of human rights as children. For example, children who were arbitrarily arrested,
abducted, conscripted as soldiers, tortured, or experienced sexual violence were not qualified as
victims in the Interim Relief Program.
Within a context where powerful Nepali leaders are diligently working to escape
prosecution, the exclusion of some victims from the Interim Relief Program is unsurprising. The
international money provided for the Interim Relief Program was distributed through the national
government to district level government education offices. Because transitional justice processes
have failed to include structural changes, the process of distribution prevented access to people
from marginalized communities.
Barriers to Access and Inequitable Access
For many conflict victims who qualified for interim relief, the process of receiving a
scholarship was extremely difficult. According to the government official responsible for
distributing the scholarships in Bardiya, families wishing to receive the scholarship must first go
to their local village development committee secretary and request a certified recommendation
letter. From there, they take the letter to the local peace committee where an additional
recommendation is required. Then, victims must travel to the district headquarters in Gulariya
where they take the recommendation to the Chief District Officer who then issues a card
identifying the person as a victim. Further, the birth registration and validation of the relationship
to the victim must be provided along with a recommendation from the current school the student
hopes to attend. If the conflict victim is able to complete the process, the school then sends the
recommendation to the District Education Office (DEO). The DEO sends the recommendation to
the Ministry of Education in Kathmandu, which decides if the child will receive a scholarship. If
the child is determined to qualify for the scholarship, the Ministry of Education sends the money
to the DEO, which distributes the money to the student’s school, family, or the student.
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While this process is similar in Nepal’s capital, the government offices responsible for
the distribution of scholarships are more accessible in Kathmandu via public transportation.
Further, many victims in rural Bardiya do not have legal documentation due to the ongoing lack
of accessibility to government offices. The majority of conflict victims living in Bardiya were
facing marginalization and difficulty in accessing healthcare, education, and food prior to the
outbreak of armed conflict. Nepal’s conflict served to entrench existing inequality and prevent
access to basic needs. Further, government officials in Bardiya are appointed by the national
government in Kathmandu. At every level of bureaucracy, conflict victims from the Tharu
community are faced with male, “high” caste government officials with greater access to
political connections and financial resources. The requests for documentation by the state
reinforce marginalized victims’ exclusion from state processes that mark belonging through
paperwork and citizenship cards. Members of the Tharu community have never had equal access
to these bureaucratic spaces and mechanisms. Yet, when victims from the Tharu community
struggle to complete the process required to obtain scholarship money for their children,
government officials, such as Balkrishna, cite victims’ ignorance, rather than the institutional
structures, as the most significant barrier.
Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, houses the national government offices responsible for
the distribution of the Interim Relief Program. According to the government official responsible
for the distribution of scholarships in Kathmandu, most children receiving scholarships through
the Interim Relief Program are attending private school. This is in contrast to children in Bardiya
receiving the scholarship who are primarily attending public school, according to government
officials in Bardiya. According to the DEO in Kathmandu, there are more than 1000 private
schools and about 300 public schools in the district. Even with the scholarship provided through
the Interim Relief Program, most conflict victims in Bardiya cannot access private school either
financially or geographically. Rather than offering opportunities for upward mobility through
education, the scholarships implemented through the Interim Relief Program have done little
more than distract from demands for greater economic and social equality, political inclusion,
and an end to poverty and serve the interests of people with greater access to power and
resources.
Further, to gain access to knowledge about the Interim Relief Program to initiate the
process, conflict victims needed to be connected to a conflict victims’ organization, a political
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party, an international non-governmental organization, or a non-governmental organization.
Children were defined in the Interim Relief Program as younger than 18 years of age, and some
victims were unable to receive the scholarship money because they had passed the age of 18
before they were informed about the program or before their families could complete the
necessary steps. In the case of scholarships in Nepal, the provision to cap the age of recipients at
age 18 has been a source of contention and has excluded many victims who have since aged out
of their qualifying status. Because the scholarship program was not started until 2008, many
people who were affected by conflict as children did not qualify. Others who qualified as
“conflict-affected” and met the age requirements at the time the scholarship program was
launched were unaware scholarships were available. They were thus disqualified from the
opportunity. Many interviewees lamented that the age cap prevented them from the possibility of
higher education. Despite several Nepalis’ childhood experiences of gross violations of human
rights and the subsequent loss of educational opportunities, powerful government officials
designed the scholarship program to the exclusion of many, particularly the most marginalized,
victims.
Regarding the scholarship program in Nepal, one female interviewee whose father was
disappeared during the armed conflict in Bardiya stated,
This scholarship for conflict-affected children is good but the way the age limit has been
prescribed, to provide up to plus two [class 11 and 12], is not satisfactory to me at all.
When it was declared that scholarships would be given, a lot of time had already passed,
and I did not get it. So, the conflict victim children should read only up to plus two and
under the age of 18? Then, above that, we should not read? The age limitation should not
have been there. The government should educate them as high as they want to study.
Several interviewees who experienced a gross violation of human rights when they were
younger than 18 years of age stated that they perceived their lack of knowledge of programs for
conflict victims as due to their lack of political connections. They felt that people with access to
political power were able to receive government benefits while they were systematically
excluded. My interviews with conflict victims and government officials responsible for the
distribution of scholarships in Kathmandu confirmed their suspicion. Additional scholarships
were provided outside of the Interim Relief Program for children with greater political
connections. For example, the national government choose children of martyrs for a greater
scholarship allowance than allotted through the relief program, with no age limit, and if the
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scholarship recipients stayed in school continuously, they could receive scholarship money all
the way through their Ph.D. (personal interview with government official in district education
office Kathmandu). Additionally, some children of the state security forces who died during the
conflict were provided with free schooling at a school for children of the police and scholarships
were made available during the armed conflict that provided aid through the master’s degree
level. A national government official in Kathmandu lamented how once the Maoists gained
political power, they were able to fund Maoist schools for “children of martyrs” throughout
Nepal. He contended the schools were breeding grounds for Maoist sympathizers, which caused
me to think about how state schools train children to be adults who protect the state and promote
homogeneous forms of nationalism. In the context of transitional justice, this is significant
because transitional justice mechanisms are meant to redress human rights and humanitarian law
violations. Nepalis who were tortured or raped by state security forces were excluded from
scholarship provisions. Further, families of the disappeared (primarily by state security forces)
and killed as civilians not taking part in combat were systemically excluded from the scholarship
money by postponing the policies until 2008, providing a smaller amount of money, and placing
an age limit of 18 years of age. Many interviewees from the Tharu community perceived their
exclusion as a continuation of the government’s commitments to nepotism and discrimination.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, members of the Tharu community in Nepal view
their community’s marginalization and poverty as intimately linked to their historical and
ongoing lack of access to education (Guneratne 2002; personal interviews). Further, education is
commonly viewed as means to resist hierarchical power arrangements socially, economically,
and politically (Guneratne 2002; personal interviews). Thus, the inability of people from the
Tharu community in Bardiya to access the scholarship program was viewed by many
interviewees as a systemic means of continuing hierarchical power arrangements benefiting
those with political connections due to their “high” caste status and access to resources (i.e.
money and land). Many victims are also aware that during the conflict children of state security
forces were awarded scholarships immediately following the death of their parents. The
scholarship money for these children was awarded until the recipients reached the age of 21 and
covered the costs of higher education through the bachelor’s degree. In interviews with recipients
of the scholarship program for children of the security forces in Kathmandu, the scholarship
money, along with additional money awarded to their families as financial compensation, has
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allowed some recipients to relocate to Kathmandu, attend private school, and complete their
college degrees. Some of the recipients were pursuing their master’s degrees and others had
siblings who secured jobs in the United States. Although recipients had varying access to
resources before and after the conflict and faced many hardships following the loss of their
parents, they were granted greater opportunities to pursue their education through the scholarship
program.
Processes of transitional justice aim to redress human rights and humanitarian law
violations, and the death of a combatant during combat is not categorized as a violation of
international law. Thus, recipients of the scholarship program for children of deceased security
forces are not considered mechanisms of transitional justice in Nepal nor are those children
included in the Interim Relief Program. Yet, Nepalis targeted for the Interim Relief Program due
to their civilian status are aware of what they perceive as inequitable access to scholarships and
financial compensation due to the loss of a parent during the armed conflict. Victims with greater
access to resources, living in urban areas, and connected to political power through family
members, a victims’ organization, non-governmental organization or international nongovernmental organization, were more likely to receive the financial compensation provided
through the Interim Relief Program earlier, and their children were subsequently more likely to
receive the available scholarship money. Victims perceived their exclusion from the scholarship
program as a continuation of Nepal’s long-standing systemic inequality.
It is unknown how many people were tortured or experienced sexual violence during the
armed conflict, and these violations are understood to be vastly underreported (OHCHR Report
2012; personal interviews with staff from non-governmental organizations working with victims
of torture and sexual violence). The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Report
(2012) cites state security forces as being responsible for the highest number of reported cases of
sexual violence and torture. Females were more likely to experience sexual violence, especially
in the absence of male family members (OHCHR Report 2012). Being “high” caste and having
access to greater resources did not shield Nepalis from the experience of state violence during
the armed conflict. Yet, interviews with staff from non-governmental organizations working with
conflict victims perceived poor people from “low” caste and ethnic groups to have been more
likely to have been tortured or experience sexual violence due to their inability to seek redress
through government institutions dominated by men who were better resourced and “high” caste,
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thus giving them access to political power. For government officials with connections to the
Nepal Army during the armed conflict, discouraging attention to these violations ensured their
continued impunity. Maoist leaders have also been implicated in the conscription of child
soldiers, which has been an ongoing contentious issue due to the perceived threat of prosecution.
While the UN facilitated a disarmament program, many former child soldiers never received
access to the resources necessary to complete their education or complete vocational training that
would ensure their livelihood.
Thus, the Interim Relief Program was designed to fail to provide redress for some of
Nepal’s most marginalized victims. In Bardiya, government security forces, including the army
and police, arrested and tortured children suspected of being Maoists in order to obtain
information about the ongoing insurgency (personal interviews). After meeting community
leaders and conflict victims in Bardiya, they continued to introduce me to people who had been
arrested by the Nepal Army and tortured when they were younger than 18 years of age. Many of
my interviewees who were tortured as children were not associated with the Maoists. However,
they were assumed to be Maoists by state forces due to their membership in the indigenous
Tharu community. During the armed conflict, the Government of Nepal named the Maoist
insurgents “terrorists,” offered financial rewards for the capture of Maoist leaders, and instituted
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance (TADO), curtailed
fundamental rights, including the right not to be arbitrarily detained, and mobilized the Nepal
Army unified with the Nepal Police and newly-created Armed Police Force against the Maoists.
The Maoists publically claimed to be fighting on behalf of historically marginalized groups,
including indigenous groups such as the Tharu, and some members of the Tharu community in
Bardiya joined the Maoist insurgency as combatants. Yet, civilians from the Tharu community
were disproportionately targeted regardless of their personal affiliation with the Maoists
(OHCHR Bardiya Report 2008), and Tharu became synonymous with terrorist (personal
conversations, interviews, and observation). For example, a male interviewee from the Tharu
community named Antaram described how being arrested and tortured hindered his ability to
excel in school:
Before I was arrested, my study was so good. I was first from class one to class five.
After the Nepal Army and the Nepal Police arrested me, my studies suffered. I wanted to
do better, but I had a kind of fear. All the time I would remember the inhuman behavior
of the Nepal Army. Because when I was arrested and kept in the Army camp, they would
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always torture me physically and mentally. They would demand information about the
insurgency. [They said] ‘If you don’t tell us, we will kill you.’ In this way, I had mental
torture. In this way, I wanted to do better in my studies, but I was unable.
As Nagengast (2003:122) argues, state violence creates punishable categories of people,
legitimizes and de-legitimizes certain groups, and enforces behavioral norms. “Torture,” she
contends, “has another, only partially successful function-to terrorize people into conformity”
(Ibid). Those who are de-legitimized are often blamed for their own oppression or torture
(Nagengast 2003). Practices of war against a magnified enemy, such as terrorism, and discourses
of power prevent the illumination of differences in power and the internal violence of the state
(Ibid). Other interviewees, primarily from the Tharu community, deemed “terrorists” during the
armed conflict, also specifically described how their experiences of detention and torture
inhibited their access to education and lamented their exclusion from the scholarship provision
and access to medical treatment.
Sexual violence that occurred during Nepal’s armed conflict is argued to be vastly
underreported due to the fear of stigmatization, retribution, and complete lack of options for
redress (Human Rights Watch 2004; OHCHR Report 2012). I decided not to interview victims of
sexual violence due to the possibility of increasing their stigmatization within their families and
communities. While a small percentage of Nepali women are publically outspoken about their
experiences of sexual violence during the armed conflict, others have been ostracized by their
husbands and in-laws after reporting their experiences to non-governmental organizations and
international non-governmental organizations leaving them without basic resources, such as food
and shelter. I also chose not to ask questions about sexual violence during interviews with
conflict victims, but some interviewees mentioned their knowledge of other people’s
experiences. Without asking follow up questions, I listened to them speak about sexual violence
that occurred during Nepal’s armed conflict. Prabal, a Tharu male interviewee who was living in
a rural village in Bardiya whose father was disappeared by the Nepal Army during the armed
conflict said,
During the conflict period, the Nepal Army was involved in the rape of different sisters in
the village and even though they had no wish, they were involved in sexual violence.
Generally the female sisters, they tell the truth to their close ones only. There is no
mechanism to help them. When they try to talk about sexual violence, members of
society will tease them...[and] think they can be treated badly. This is the reason why
their dignity in society has been lowered…So, the girls which were subjected to rape and
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sexual violence have not been able to say what they have been through, because they
think it will be a shame for them in the society. The government should make necessary
mechanisms [so they can receive financial relief and] the culprit brought under the
boundary of the crime (the perpetrator should be prosecuted).
As stated by Prabal, the experience of sexual violence continued to be associated with the
loss of dignity. Interviewees also mentioned the loss of dignity associated with their experiences
of torture, conscription as child soldiers, and the killing and disappearance of their parents. Many
interviewees felt as if the Government of Nepal, including the Maoist party, should publically
acknowledge victims’ dignity through various mechanisms. In conversations with people outside
the Tharu community, conflict victims in Bardiya continue to be associated with Maoism and/or
terrorism rather than being acknowledged as having experienced an undeserved violation of
international law and personal dignity. For victims from the Tharu community, they are then
doubly stigmatized. Formal acknowledgement of state responsibility as envisioned through
formal reparations processes were thus important to victims who felt as if their dignity had been
lost. Till now, all reported victims of sexual violence during the armed conflict are female.
According to reports released by the UN, non-governmental organizations, and international
non-governmental organizations, state security forces frequently subjected girls and women to
sexual violence during the armed conflict; rape was common when searching for Maoists and to
punish female Maoist cadres and sympathizers (Across the Lines; IHRICON 2007; OHCHR
Report 2012). Women who lived close to army barracks or perceived Maoist strongholds were at
a greater risk (Ibid). Children (i.e. girls younger than 18) were particularly vulnerable to sexual
violence during the armed conflict. More than one third of reported victims of sexual violence
during Nepal’s armed conflict were younger than 18 and many of those were younger than 15
years old (OHCHR Report 2012; Transitional Justice Resource Archive Nepal).
Even if children were recognized as “conflict victims” through the Interim Relief
Program and qualified for the scholarship program, scholarships were only available for up to
three children per family. This left families in a position where they had to choose which of their
children to send to school. Given the economic situation of many victims in Bardiya, parents
were already faced with this choice. In this economic situation, girl children are often the ones
excluded from education. As Dhriti, a female interviewee, stated, “since my economic condition
is very pathetic, my mom has to decide to whom I should teach, to whom I should educate, to my
daughter or to my son?” Despite many parents’ desires to educate their daughters, males are
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typically given priority if resources are limited. The limit on the number of children per family
who could receive the scholarship prevented families facing an even greater lack of resources
from the possibility of educating all their children and was especially exclusionary to girls. Girls
in Nepal already face barriers to complete higher education, particularly girls from rural villages
who are poor. When those conditions are compounded by the experience of the death or
disappearance of their father, accessing education and resources were more difficult.
Rather than redressing the violations they endured or addressing the ongoing exclusion
that children from marginalized groups face accessing education, the relief program entrenched
their exclusion through the denial of scholarships to children who endured sexual violence or
torture, lived in rural areas, were poor, were from “lower” caste and ethnic groups, and those
without access to power or assistance to secure the scholarships in time.
Barriers to Continuing Education After Conflict
Students who were able to overcome the barriers to access were faced with difficulty in
maintaining the scholarship. Many of my interviewees who received the scholarship were unable
to maintain it due to the difficulties they faced as a result of the conflict. In addition to the age
limit of 18, scholarship guidelines include a provision to discontinue the scholarship for lack of
attendance or performance. Poor children who lost their parent during the conflict had additional
household duties, including caring for their siblings, agricultural work, and were often required
to work in wage labor. For some conflict-affected children whose families had greater access to
resources, the scholarship allowed them to attend boarding school where they could focus on
their studies. Yet, other interviewees’ economic situation required them to work so they could
provide for their families. Poor children whose father was killed or disappeared, along with their
mothers, also faced stigmatization within their villages, schools, and families. Their
stigmatization made access to housing, food, and education more difficult.
Interviewees in Bardiya who lost the scholarship due to lack of attendance also cited
personal illness as a reason why they could not attend school regularly. In many villages in
Bardiya, access to medical treatment is limited. Those who did not meet the attendance
requirements or failed a class lost the scholarship and were henceforth excluded from the
program.
Further, the scholarships did not provide the full amount of money needed for poor
children to attend public school. Although there are no public school tuition fees in Nepal,
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families needed sufficient resources to lose the labor of their children and were also required to
provide money for their school supplies. Without the income of a father, this was a very difficult
task for some. Not only the scholarship program, but also many aspects of Nepal’s education
system serve to entrench inequality. Tuition classes (private tutoring) are required for most
children to pass their classes. This creates an additional barrier to families without the financial
means to provide such resources to their children. Of the very few poor children in Bardiya
affected by conflict whose families had access to the resources to help them complete class 10,
they were then faced with passing the School Leaving Certificate (SLC), also known as the “iron
gate” in Nepal. As Mani, a male interviewee who was arrested and tortured by state security
forces when he was approximately 13 years of age, explained,
The condition of our house was so that we didn’t have enough food to eat. We didn’t
have enough money for medical care if we got sick. While I was studying, I had to go to
work in the field two to four days per week. With the money I earned, I used to pay my
school fees and buy my notebooks and pens. By doing that I studied up to class 10, but I
could not pass the SLC. I could not complete my SLC because of the condition of the
house…if there was money, I could read and my parents could educate me.
Students in Nepal who do not pass the SLC are not able to complete their studies beyond
class 10. Families with resources can send their children to private school where they have a
much greater chance of passing the SLC, learning English, going on complete classes 11 and 12,
and then studying at the bachelor’s level. According to the District Education Office in Bardiya,
the current SLC pass rate for children attending public schools is 22% while children in private
schools have an 85% pass rate. Additionally, families with greater access to resources can ensure
that their children study subjects that will ensure their viability in the job market to secure higher
paying jobs. For those who cannot secure employment within Nepal, higher education
determines in which country they will work as well as their working conditions. Educated
graduates who speak English are more likely to secure employment in safer jobs abroad. Nepalis
who are less educated are more likely to work in unskilled or semiskilled labor positions often in
dangerous working conditions in Qatar, India, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and other
countries. The scholarship program did not provide enough money for children to attend public
school let alone private school making it very difficult for poor conflict affected families to
educate their children. Interviewees expressed a desire for higher education, as it was perceived
to be a means to access jobs that would provide sufficient resources for their families’ survival.
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The scholarship guidelines have prevented many who experienced gross violations of human
rights during Nepal’s armed conflict from receiving scholarships through the relief program and
thus excluded them from the possibility of education.
Interviews with people who experienced gross violations of human rights as children in
Bardiya revealed that one of the only semblances of a state-led mechanism of transitional justice
had failed to provide them with a sense of justice. One female interviewee explained,
These days even when transportation vehicles kill chickens, then they get [financial]
relief. There is justice. So, here is the case of murder [of my father]. Then we should not
get anything? They get justice. We are not getting justice. The children of Army get
justice when anything happens. If they die or commit suicide, arrangements are made for
food, shelter, and clothes. For us, there is nothing.
In Bardiya, interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with mechanisms of transitional justice
and their ongoing distrust in the Nepali government. Given that many of them experienced a
gross violation of human rights at the hands of a member of the Nepal Police or Army, this is not
surprising. Children whose parents were disappeared or killed during the armed conflict were
given differential access to the scholarship provision and children who were raped, tortured, or
conscripted as soldiers were excluded completely. In Bardiya, interviewees’ perceptions of the
national government and the scholarship program were overwhelmingly negative. The following
quotes are all from male and female interviewees residing in Bardiya whose fathers had been
forcibly disappeared by state security forces:
If we see in Bardiya, the conflict victim children are not much educated. This is because
families do not have the resources to educate their children. The government has given
this scholarship just so it appears that something has been given. If the government
wanted to do something for the conflict victims, then it would not have prescribed the age
[of 18].
Whoever goes to the government, before they go to the government, they say ‘we will do
something for you,’ but after they reach to the government, they do not do anything. And
now it’s been 13 years and all the big political parties have reached the government but
have not done anything till today. At one time we felt maybe the Maoist party will do
something for us, but they have not done anything after they went to the government.
What to say about the national government? In Nepal, the leaders change time and again.
They talk a lot but do nothing. They will help to their own relatives only. That much.
They do not do anything. They do only corruption. More than corruption, they corrupt
people, their thoughts, money, and many things.
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The scholarship program in Nepal has failed to provide conflict victims with a sense of
justice and redress. Further, it has served to entrench inequality and perpetuate distrust in the
Nepali government. Every conflict victim I interviewed in Nepal, regardless of their access to
education or region of residence, expressed distrust in the national government and commonly
cited systemic exclusion, nepotism, and corruption as the sources of their distrust.
Conclusion
During Nepal’s armed conflict, schools were commonly sites of violence and the Maoists
specifically targeted private schools as a tactic to highlight how the privatization of education
reinforced exclusion and inequality. Yet, ten years of armed conflict failed to ensure
marginalized groups’ equal access to educational opportunities. Although the state implemented
scholarships for some “conflict affected children,” the scholarship provision through the Interim
Relief Program was designed and implemented to ensure the exclusion of poor rural victims
from historically marginalized groups. In Nepal, access to formal education continues to be a
marker of status and hierarchy. While systemic barriers to education remain, the inability of poor
parents to educate their children, ironically, is associated by some government officials with their
not knowing the value of education, as illustrated by Balkrishna’s quote in the introduction to
this chapter, and discourses of knowing/not knowing are utilized to obscure attention to power
differentials. Meanwhile, poor parents often described to me their willingness to do everything
possible, including taking out loans, to educate their children. Education continues to be
understood as a means to overcome inequitable structures of power and obtain dignity. However,
the barriers conflict victims in Bardiya experience trying to access scholarships demonstrate not
only that structural inequality still exists during the “transitional” period, but also that the state is
committed to maintaining it. As one interviewee stated, “To date, the government is of no use,
but let’s hope for better.”
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Chapter 6
The Performance of Inclusion and Exclusionary Truth
“The political parties picked us to be on the commission.” I was sitting across from
Dhanvi, the only member from the Dalit community on Nepal’s truth commission. I was
perplexed that she said this to me. I hadn’t yet asked her a question. I had only just introduced
myself as a Ph.D. student conducting research and sat down in her office after being asked by
Akash, another member of the commission I had scheduled to interview, to wait there.
Although it was well known that the members of both truth commissions were politically
appointed (and it was publicized in newspapers and openly criticized by the UN, victim-activists,
staff from non-governmental organizations, donors, and diplomats), it was also a taboo and
contested subject among the members of the commissions and the Nepal government. The
commissions were meant to be neutral fact-finding bodies that would, among other tasks,
“investigate incidents of gross violations of human rights, find out and record the truth and
[publicize] it” (www.trc.gov.np/about-us).
Akash entered the room and sat down to my right in a black leather chair, identical to the
one I sat in, while Dhanvi stayed seated in her office chair behind her desk to my left as she was
reading the newspaper. My interview with Akash then focused on the complaint-taking process.
Both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on
Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) were in the process of accepting “complaints” related to
the armed conflict. During the interview, Akash asked to take a short break and left me in the
room with Dhanvi who again began offering information. Speaking about the Dalit community
in Nepal, she said, “They are uneducated and backward. They don’t have jobs.” When explaining
how she became educated, she said, “I worked hard.” Although I completed my interview with
Akash, it was Dhanvi’s brief comments that day that left me thinking about the performance of
inclusion in Nepal.
Dhanvi’s seat on the commission was presented as a symbol of inclusion and
representation of the Dalit community. However, despite the inclusion of a member of the Dalit
community on the commission, Dhanvi stated clearly that she holds her seat because she was
appointed by a political party to represent their interests throughout the state-led truth-seeking
processes. In her comments, she also held up the myth of meritocracy-working hard as a means
for achieving upward mobility-without mentioning how systems of inequality and nepotism
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prevent people from gaining access to jobs, particularly in government-appointed positions, and
in lucrative positions at the UN, international non-governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. It seemed to me that Dhanvi had failed to differentiate between
kinds of “hard work” that are politically and economically rewarded and those that manifest as
systems of slavery (e.g. kamaiya8 labor). Her presence on the commission also struck me as more
like a performance (than a representation) of inclusion.
I soon began to notice that these patterns-or performances, as I call them-of inclusion
extended to other groups as well. Boldly, while sitting next to two male commission members, a
female commission member named Maya said,
Women are not a priority. They are a priority in name only. The policies call for the
inclusion of women, children, and the elderly. There is no such special provision to take
complaints from women…I am a woman on the commission and most of the other
members are male. I do not have an equal voice on the commission.
The state policy that established the truth commissions stipulates that at least one woman serve
on each commission. Once established, there were two female members on the TRC and one
female member on the CIEDP.
My conversations with Dhanvi and Maya illustrate how inclusion is both performed and
politicized in state-led truth commissions implemented as mechanisms of transitional justice in
Nepal. Likewise, the inclusion of children in “complaint-taking” processes is stipulated in the
policies that established the commissions and mandated their work. In this chapter, based on
observations of Nepal’s truth-seeking processes as well as interviews and conversations with
victims and facilitators, I examine how the state performs inclusion and question what political
work is done through this façade. I argue the performance of the inclusion of “children” and
historically excluded groups in truth-seeking processes serve to maintain exclusionary power
structures.

8

Within the kamaiya labor system, landlords tie entire families to systems of debt bondage from
which they can rarely escape. Kamaiya laborers are agriculturalists from the Tharu community
and are typically not allotted sufficient means to sustain their livelihood, consistently placing
them and their family members in greater debt. Although outlawed, many families continue to be
systemically prevented from escaping the consequences of generations of exploitive labor
practices and still consider themselves kamaiya as they are working for exploitative landlords
despite legal protections. Tharu resistance to their exploitation by landlords has continually been
curtailed by state violence. Also see Chapter 3 in this dissertation.
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Truth-Seeking Commissions
Truth-seeking commissions, typically formed after an armed conflict, are temporary
bodies created to establish a truthful historical record, formally acknowledge past human rights
violations, promote reconciliation, identify perpetrators and the whereabouts of the disappeared,
recommend reparations and reforms, and address the needs of victims. Between 1983 and 2010,
more than 40 truth commissions were established globally (Hayner 2011). Early scholarly
debates on transitional justice often centered on the utility of trials as opposed to truth-seeking
mechanisms as a means to establish justice. Within this debate, truth-seeking commissions are
understood to be more attentive to victims’ needs than punitive measures by focusing on their
stories, making the public aware of their suffering, and recommending reparations (Hayner 2011;
Minnow 1998). Further, truth commissions are argued to strengthen democratic processes and
rebuild trust between citizens and the state (see e.g. Freeman and Hayner 2003).
Nepal’s peace agreement stipulated that a “High-level Truth and Reconciliation
Commission” be established to “probe into those involved in serious violation[s] of human rights
and crime[s] against humanity [during] the armed conflict for creating an atmosphere for
reconciliation in the society” and stipulated that the names and addresses of the people who were
disappeared or killed during the conflict be made public within 60 days (CPA 2006). More than
eight years after the signing of the peace agreement, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
a Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons, were finally established in
February 2015.
Anthropologists examining transitional justice have illuminated the importance of
understanding “local justice,” or the ways in which justice is produced, experienced, and
perceived in specific localities (Burnet 2008; Clark 2009; Drexler 2006; Hinton 2011; Robben
2011; Sanford 2003; Shaw 2007, 2011; Theidon 2007; Wagner 2008; Wilson 2001). Scholars
have given particular attention how transitional justice mechanisms, including truth-seeking
commissions, are implemented in ways that are considered “top-down” or exclusionary towards
victims’ needs (Laplante and Theidon 2007; Lundy and McGovern 2008; McEvoy and
McGregor 2008; Shaw 2007). Dragovic-Soso (2016) argues a principal reason for the failure of
the truth commission in Bosnia was the lack of legitimacy among victims’ associations who
perceived the commission as elitist and exclusionary. Likewise, Robins (2011, 2012) argues that
transitional justice in Nepal has been an elite-driven process that has ignored victims’ needs. As
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a result of these findings, scholars and activists have called for a more victim-centric transitional
justice in Nepal where victims are engaged in the process rather than dependent on national and
international agencies to speak on their behalf (Robins and Bhandari 2012).
Other researchers, however, identify the benefits of truth-seeking processes. Sanford
(2003), in her research on Guatemala, argues that truth-seeking aids in healing and provides the
foundation for rebuilding democracy, justice, and trust. Burnet (2008) contends knowing the
details of their loved ones’ deaths during the genocide in Rwanda was not only a political
necessity but a spiritual need for survivors. Yet, she also draws attention to how the gacaca court
system, implemented to end impunity, promote reconciliation, and reveal the truth, has led to the
repatriation of remains for some families while other victims have been excluded from
knowledge of their loved ones’ fate and whereabouts (Ibid).
Overall, however, given national and international political influences on processes of
transitional justice, scholars have challenged the utility of truth commissions to achieve their
desired outcomes of helping victims to heal, promoting accountability and reconciliation, and
establishing an authoritative record (Daly 2008; Mendeloff 2004; Sundar 2004) and called for
greater attention to how truth-seeking commissions can be politicized and polarizing (e.g. Issacs
2010). Further, they have questioned what kinds of knowledge can be produced through truth
commissions (Coxshall 2005) and challenged assumptions that truth that can be independent
from state power (Thomson 2000). Others have argued the political conditions in which truthseeking commissions operate (Quinn 2004), the choice of members of the commissions, and how
they discover and present their findings can determine what kind of knowledge is produced
(Chapman and Ball 2001). Wilson (2001), in his examination of the truth and reconciliation
commission in South Africa, argues that victims’ needs were secondary to rebuilding the postapartheid state and political elites inserted notions of justice that were not satisfactory for many
victims. Millar (2010) contends the educated elite minority had divergent experiences and
perspectives of the TRC in Sierra Leone compared to the non-elite majority. He argues that
members of the elite, with greater access to resources and power, were more likely to be in a
position to take advantage of the large amount of funding for peacebuilding after the war and feel
as if the TRC helped them while non-elite interviewees expressed negative attitudes about their
experiences of the TRC (Ibid).
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Children’s Inclusion in Truth-Seeking
While children are argued to be uniquely vulnerable during armed conflict (Aptel 2012;
Ni Aolain 2007; Machel 1996; Ramirez-Barat 2012; UN 1325; UN Approach to Transitional
Justice), truth-seeking commissions have not consistently focused on children’s experiences or
their inclusion. However, as international attention surrounding child soldiers increased, such as
in Sierra Leone, so did the performance of their inclusion in truth-seeking processes. Although
the truth commission in Sierra Leone (2004) was the first to explicitly mention children in its
mandate, involve children in statement taking, and publish a child-friendly version of its final
report, violations against children were documented by earlier truth-seeking commissions in
Chile (1991), El Salvador (1993), South Africa (2002), Haiti (1996), and Guatemala (1999).
Perhaps following the lead of Sierra Leone, the final reports of the truth commissions in Peru
(2003), Liberia (2009), and Timor Leste (2005) included chapters focused on children, and the
truth commissions in South Africa, Liberia, and Timor-Leste facilitated public hearings for
children. The Liberian TRC included children throughout the process by training statementtakers to work with children, hosting TRC awareness-raising workshops for children, holding
children’s hearings and panels, and exhibiting children’s art and writings about their experiences
of war (Sowa 2010). However, definitions of “children” are not applied consistently in the
inclusion of children in truth-seeking commissions. For example, the commission in Liberia
decided “children” only included people who were 18 or younger during the work of the TRC
(Sowa 2010) while the South African TRC refused to accept statements or testimonies from
people younger than 18 (Pigou 2010).
Scholars examining children’s inclusion and participation in truth-seeking commissions
have argued for greater attention to structures of power and inequality (Pigou 2010) and
highlighted children’s emphases on educational opportunities, sustainable livelihood, safe
drinking water, and the construction of hospitals (Sowa 2010). Cook and Heykoop (2010), based
on their research in Sierra Leone, contend children are more likely to report positive experiences
with commissions if they are provided economic, social, and emotional support. Without such
support, children’s statement-taking experiences can increase their vulnerability and children
may feel as if their statement-giving experiences were alienating and useless (Ibid). They argue
that children’s basic economic, education, and protection needs should be linked to truth-telling
processes and advocate for poverty reduction and children’s long-term emotional,
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developmental, and material support (Ibid: 190). Cook and Heykoop’s (2010) findings suggest
that children’s inclusion in truth-seeking often serves as a performance to conceal global and
national systems of inequality. This is particularly illuminated when children, as in Sierra Leone,
request access to safe drinking water, health, education, and sustainable livelihoods and the truth
commission produces a child-friendly version of its report to symbolize their inclusion rather
than addressing their stated priorities.
Likewise, in Nepal, the inclusion of children’s voices regarding truth-seeking processes
was symbolized even before the establishment of the commissions, but their opinions were
disregarded. For example, in 2008, when Nepali children (people younger than 18 years of age at
the time) were invited to participate in a workshop on children and transitional justice, they
expressed their opposition to a truth commission established and supported by national political
actors (Siegrist 2010). Children explicitly stated they didn’t want the “truth” utilized for political
purposes (Ibid). Their input was ignored, and seven years later two state-led truth-seeking
commissions were established in Nepal.
Policies “for Truth”
Many victims who were younger than 18 during the armed conflict had aged out of the
internationally defined category of “childhood” during Nepal’s transitional period. Thus, I was
struck by the inclusion of special provisions for “children” in both the Enforced Disappearances
Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 2014 (TRC Act), which established the
commissions, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Rules, 2016 (TRC Rules), which
stipulated the truth commission’s activities. A definition of “children” was not included in either
document and no clarification was provided to explain why victims’ categorization as children
might require special provisions. Consistent with most transitional justice policies focusing on
children, neither the TRC Act nor the TRC Rules included acknowledgement of the systemic
discrimination or inequality experienced by children from historically marginalized groups. Also
noticeably absent was any explanation of how their positionality contributed to their
vulnerability during the armed conflict. Regarding special provisions for children, the TRC Act
(2014:15) states,
The Commission may make a separate arrangement as prescribed for facilitation of
children, senior citizens, person[s] with disabilit[ies] and person[s] subjected to sexual
violence in the act of filing a complaint with the Commission…[and] in the act of making
a statement or testimony.
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Throughout the TRC Rules, “children” are assumed to especially need psychological
support and are conflated with senior citizens, people with disabilities, and people who
experienced sexual violence. Yet, their need for special provisions and preference as children is
not explained. In the TRC Codes of Conduct, discrimination is prohibited at an individual level.
Yet, the written policies of Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions do not indicate if or how victims
of the armed conflict might experience processes of transitional justice differently due to
systemic discrimination and inequality. Likewise, “children” are written in both the TRC Act and
Rules as static, universal, and homogenous. In semi-structured interviews with members of the
commissions involved in the complaint-taking process, the definitions of “children” they used
were inconsistent, and they did not consistently clarify the reasons why children needed special
protection or priority. Some members of the commissions argued that “children,” as defined in
the TRC Act and Rules, referred to victims who were younger than a certain age during the
conflict while others argued “children” meant victims who were younger than a certain age at the
time they filed a complaint. Although members of both commissions were aware that a child is
defined as younger than 18 according to international law, they sometimes also referred to
children as younger than 16, as codified in Nepal’s domestic law.
During my last visit to the CIEDP for updates, a commission member named Satindra
described to me how the commission would prioritize “children” who were disappeared during
the armed conflict. When I first arrived, he said they had received 112 applications about people
who were disappeared when they were children, defined as below the age of 16. Satindra stated,
“we will give priority to children, senior citizens, and women and then to ordinary people.” Here,
he explained senior citizens were defined as more than 50 years old. Satindra thus qualified men
between the ages of 17 and 50 as “ordinary” while children, senior citizens, and women were
presented as outside the category of “ordinary people.” The specific definitions and prioritization
of these groups is particularly odd considering that it was men who were overwhelmingly
disappeared during the armed conflict (more than 90%) leaving living family members that have
unique needs due to their age and gender.
Further, these particular prioritizations divert attention away from why people from
certain groups were forcibly disappeared during the armed conflict. In Bardiya, for example,
every woman and child who was disappeared was from the Tharu community. Later, during the
same conversation, he said, “women, children, and elderly people are in priority. Hearings can be
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confidential for these groups. For women, people from the same gender can be involved.” I
asked, “what does ‘children’ mean?” He said, “per Nepali law, under 18.” (Nepali domestic law
lists children as younger than 16 years of age). I asked, “now or during the conflict?” “It can be
both,” he replied. “What does senior citizens mean?” I inquired. “For me,” he said, “60 plus.”
When I arrived, Satindra had defined children as younger than 16 and later as younger than 18.
This was one of many interviews with members of both commissions where they defined
children (and, in this interview, also senior citizens) differently even in the same conversation.
Shore and Wright argue anthropologists can read policies in a number of ways, including
“as narratives that serve to justify or condemn the present, or as rhetorical devices and discursive
formations that function to empower some people and silence others” (1997:7). Thus, despite the
outward signs of inclusion and prioritization of certain vulnerable groups, the policies regarding
state-led truth commissions, and the lack of consistent and clear criteria by which to define those
groups, actually reflects the political and economic exclusion of the majority of Nepal’s
population and silences poor, rural, conflict victims from marginalized communities. The TRC
policies also conceal the political work of the state-led truth commissions in Nepal, which
national leaders have controlled to obscure their complicity in gross violations of human rights
that occurred during the armed conflict.
The Politicization of the Commissions and the Inclusion of “Children”
The amount of time that passed between the signing of the peace agreement in 2006 and
the establishment of the commissions, the political appointments of members of both
commissions, and the amnesty provisions for accused perpetrators were all ongoing sources of
contention during the transitional period. Since the cessation of armed conflict in Nepal,
prominent human rights/transitional justice organizations, diplomats, donors, and the UN have
prioritized prosecutions as a necessary mechanism of transitional justice (Robins 2011, 2012,
2013; Sajjad 2013). Yet, many accused perpetrators of conflict-era rights violations have secured
positions in the highest levels of the Nepali government. Thus, as is the case in many countries
(e.g. Drexler 2010; Finnstrom 2010; Robben 2013; Ross 2010; Waldorf 2010; Wilson 2001),
powerful national leaders in the Nepali government have insisted on amnesty as a means to
maintain peace in response to human rights organizations’ and the UN’s insistence on
prosecutions for war crimes. This debate, along with ongoing political instability, contributed to
the postponement of the truth commissions and inevitably led to political work to conceal, rather
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than reveal, victims’ experiences. In interviews with members of both commissions, they stated
that they had drafted the rules and codes of conduct and subsequently powerful government
officials amended the commissions’ policies to ensure their own protection from prosecution.
Further, the inclusion of “children” in Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions was politicized
due to the issue of child soldiers. Following the armed conflict, the United Nations Mission in
Nepal (UNMIN) facilitated a reintegration program of former Maoist combatants into the Nepal
Army. Of those registered through UNMIN, 4,009 were disqualified from reintegration due to
their status as minors (defined as younger than 18 years of age) or late recruits (2,974 minors and
1,035 late recruits) (Robins, et al. 2016). Stigmatized as “disqualified,” they were given 22,000
rupees (approximately $285) and prevented from joining the Nepal Army. For ex-combatants
who were not disqualified, they were given the option of being integrated into the Nepal Army or
receiving cash payments depending on their rank. Approximately 3,200 chose to be integrated
into the Nepal Army and 16,000 received a cash payment between 500,000 rupees and 900,000
rupees (approximately $6,200-$9,300) (Ibid). Thus, their age-the determinant of their having
endured a gross violation of human rights and what makes their recruitment a war crime-has
prevented them from receiving equal financial compensation in the reintegration program.
Although some received counseling and/or vocational training, many former child soldiers are
dissatisfied with their treatment during Nepal’s transitional period (Robins, et al. 2016). Due to
their frustration with former child soldiers’ exclusion from integration and the 2008 Interim
Relief Program (discussed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation), victim-activists have advocated for
their inclusion in truth-seeking processes. Yet, during the complaint-taking period, members of
the TRC publically disagreed on whether child soldiers should be included.
Just after the 90-day deadline to file complaints had passed in July 2016, I met with a
TRC commission member, Ankit, in his office. I arrived a few minutes after 10:00 a.m. when the
office opened. As I walked in, he was sitting behind his desk, and while I sat down across from
him, he asked a young man to bring the newspaper and black tea. This was our second time
meeting in his office, and one of the first things he said to me was, “I feel alienated from the
other members of the commission.” I asked him to explain the challenges he was facing. He
responded by saying:
I have tried to bring up issues related to child soldiers, but the chair of the commission
refused to address these issues or add them to the meeting agenda. [Two other members
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of the commission] strongly requested that those issues not be brought up in our meeting.
The issues I’m raising are challenging but important.
These debates among members of the commission were made public on social media and
through national newspapers where commission members expressed their opinions on the
inclusion of former child soldiers in truth seeking processes. Thus, within these debates,
“children” referred to people who were now older than 18 years of age but had joined the
Maoists as combatants when they were younger than 15 years of age. Politicians and victimactivists in Nepal were well aware of the prosecutions of leaders in other countries due to their
utilization of child soldiers during armed conflict. So, debates around the inclusion of children,
like most of the debates surrounding transitional justice in Nepal, became consumed by powerful
political leaders’ escape from prosecution for war crimes rather than focused on the inclusion of
victims in processes that would provide them with other forms of redress, such as greater access
to sustainable livelihoods. The TRC officially announced in August 2016 that the use of child
soldiers during the armed conflict would be put on hold without further consideration. The
official reasoning behind this decision was that the use of child soldiers was viewed as a rights
violation within the Maoist party, and should thus be handled within the party. In November
2016, the Supreme Court ordered Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions to investigate all filed
complaints.
What Children?
Although children were explicitly included in both the TRC Act and Rules, staff
members at the LPC office in Bardiya reported that no children filed complaints with their office.
Likewise, staff at the Women and Children’s Office in Bardiya reported they had not received
any complaints from children. At the TRC and CIEDP offices in Kathmandu, members of the
commissions reported they were unaware of any children filing complaints. However, some
members also stated they had not yet compiled data on the age of people who had filed
complaints. One prominent member of a local victims’ organization in Bardiya said he assisted
two children (both younger than 18 years of age) who were orphans to file complaints regarding
the disappearance of their fathers. In practice, neither special accommodations nor priority were
given to victims who were, according to international law or Nepali domestic law, children
during the armed conflict or during the complaint-taking period.
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Coming back to the interview with TRC commission member Ankit: after the initial
complaint taking process had ended, I asked him about the inclusion of children. He said, “there
was no one available to take complaints from women and children...and no extensive training
was provided to deal with children and women or even emotional men.” Here women, children,
and emotional men are conflated and the reason for special training on how to deal with children
is framed as necessary because they would be more “emotional.” Throughout my time in Nepal,
commission members never came to a consensus on what was meant by the word “children” in
the policies mandating their work.
Children who were Tortured during Nepal’s Armed Conflict and Continued Exclusion
Although the members of Nepal’s truth commissions had divergent and inconsistent
definitions of “children,” children are defined in international law, the basis of transitional justice
processes, as younger than 18 years of age. State security forces did not distinguish people as
“children” nor exclude them from torture when they were seeking information about Maoists
during the armed conflict. Torture is listed in TRC policies as a gross violation of human rights,
and therefore, incidents of torture were to be included in the “complaint-taking” process by the
TRC. Further, the TRC Rules stipulate that victims of torture be included in the commission
members’ recommendations for “compensation, facilities or concessions for victims.” Yet,
victims’ experiences of access to state-led mechanisms of transitional justice were divergent
depending on their positionality. Victims’ differential experiences mimicked historical patterns
of the exclusion of certain caste and ethnic groups and poor Nepalis living in rural areas. In this
section, I examine the experiences and perceptions of two males who were tortured by Nepal’s
state security forces when they were younger than 18 and focus on their divergent experiences of
access to Nepal’s truth-seeking commissions.
Priya introduced me to Kumar. Kumar, a member of the Tharu community, works as a
kamaiya9 laborer and lives in a rural village in Bardiya with his family. Priya, a young Tharu
female living in the same village whose father was killed during the armed conflict, suggested I
speak with Kumar and invited him to meet me at her home. We sat down in a back room where
Priya’s mother was preparing tea. After offering us all tea, she and Priya left the room. As I sat
across from Kumar, who was arrested by state security forces when he was 17 years old, he
explained that for him
9

See footnote 5 on page 72.
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life is about learning how to be and living as kamaiya. Since my childhood, I have been
working in other’s field, and, even today, it has been continuing. From the date I started
knowing things, I am kamaiya. We hoped our lives would change if we could buy some
land, but we cannot. We even don’t have land to build a house. While working as
kamaiya, [the armed conflict started], and then the army took me from my home. When I
was taken, my elder brother’s wife was beaten. After I was taken, they locked me up. I
was detained for nine months. I was beaten for four hours in the morning and four hours
in the evening. I was beaten, and my life passed for nine months. They beat me and asked
whether I was involved in the Maoists or not. I was beaten from my backbone to my legs.
Except my head, they beat me everywhere. We were forced to stay in a dark room, the
same room where we urinated and excreted. We never knew when it was day and when it
was night. I was beaten every evening and also beaten while eating my food. This is how
nine months passed. When ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] used to
visit there, we were all hidden. We could not go out. They [army and police were used
synonymously throughout the interview to refer to who arrested, detained, and tortured
Kumar] dug a big hole in the jungle, and we were kept there with our hands tied day and
night. My nine months passed that way, and when I was taken back home, [the Army]
said [to my family] that I was only taken for questioning and sent back to home. When I
arrived home, my family said they had already conducted a funeral ceremony for me
thinking I had been killed. I was severely beaten. I had pain in my backbone. I could not
walk. And what else to say? Now, still I have pain in my backbone that sometimes
increases severely. When my brother searched for me, he was also beaten.
While Kumar may have sympathized with or even supported the Maoists, particularly given their
stated opposition to exploitative labor practices, his positionality alone as a young kamaiya
laborer from the Tharu community in a rural village in Bardiya increased his risk of arrest and
torture by the Nepal Army. I met many members of the Tharu community who spoke of their
torture as children by state forces during Nepal’s armed conflict.
Although the state specifically targeted Nepalis based on their membership in a particular
caste or ethnic group, if someone was suspected of being a Maoist, their “high” caste status alone
did not shield them from state violence. I met Anil through a prominent activist for victims’
rights in Nepal who was detained and tortured alongside him during the armed conflict.
Members of the Nepal Army arrested Anil, a “high” caste male, when he was 16 years old, and
he was subsequently detained at an army barracks in Kathmandu. As I sat across from him, Anil
described how he was playing with his friends when a van pulled up, men jumped out, grabbed
and blindfolded him, and drove away. At 16 years of age, when he was taken, he said that he had
no connection to the Maoist party nor was he aware of their ideologies. Anil believed he was
arrested because his brother’s friend, who was also arrested, said Anil’s name while being
tortured by the Nepal Army. Despite Anil’s lack of any connection to the Maoists, he was
83

abducted, tortured, and detained for 18 months in the barracks. He described to me how, for 18
months, he was constantly blindfolded and his hands were tied. He held his hands together in
front of his body while saying “in the morning” and then held his hands behind his back saying
“at night.” He and other prisoners at the barracks were not allowed to use a toilet leaving them
no choice but to sit in their own excrement.
Among Anil’s most debilitating physical consequence as a result of his torture is kidney
damage. He said a physician told him the kidney damage was likely due to his attempts to not
urinate for 18 months. Anil described to me how he was questioned while he was hit
“everywhere” repeatedly “by two or three people” with a plastic pipe and how his head was
immersed in water. Then he offered me his hand to show me the scar from being shocked by an
“electric stick” and explained how he was forced to sign a piece of paper formally admitting to
being a terrorist. Anil also described being hidden by the Nepal Army during International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) inspections of the barracks but did not say he was forced
into a hole in the ground with other detainees like Kumar described. As Nepal’s peace agreement
was being signed, Anil said, a representative from Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) assisted in his release and rehabilitation.
Anil reported his experiences to both the OHCHR and the National Human Rights
Commission, and subsequently received 25,000 rupees (approximately $250) from the
Government of Nepal. A representative of OHCHR also assisted in his arranging a temporary
place to stay and medical treatment. Since Kumar’s release, he has not reported his experiences
of torture to or received financial compensation or medical treatment from any UN organization,
non-governmental organization, or the Government of Nepal.
Torture victims were excluded from Nepal’s Interim Relief Program, regardless of their
age at the time of the human rights violation. Anil was fortunate that some medical care and
minimal compensation were provided for him. Further, Kumar’s family’s lack of access to
resources has prevented his pursuit of medical treatment and forced his immediate reentry upon
his release into an exploitative labor relationship with a landlord. Despite his physical pain since
being tortured, Kumar continues to work as an agricultural laborer. Although his labor provides
sufficient resources to sustain his family’s lives, they continue to be indebted to a landlord and
all lack access to medical care and basic education. He expressed fear that his children would
remain kamaiya laborers. It’s difficult for most Nepalis to find work, and Anil laments his
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inability to provide for his family. He believes the consequences of his detention, specifically his
disabilities and lack of education, make finding work more difficult. However, Anil described
being fortunate that his natal family and his wife work to provide sufficient resources enabling
him to live a somewhat more comfortable life than Kumar. Anil’s access to the knowledge of the
OHCHR and the National Human Rights Commission allowed him to seek medical care and an
extremely modest amount of compensation.
Access to knowledge and resources in Nepal is linked to privilege and power. Those with
privilege and power are better able to access knowledge and vice versa. Knowledge of how to
negotiate with those in power has historically economically elevated members of marginalized
communities, including the Tharu. At the same time, as discussed in the last chapter, members of
the Tharu community often associate their ongoing marginalization and their families’ loss of
land with their lack of formal education and the perceived trickery of people from other
communities with greater connections to power. In Nepal, truth-seeking commissions, argued to
be more victim-centric than prosecutions, have thus far prioritized some victims’ complaints to
the exclusion of others. In 2008, knowledge of the truth-seeking commissions was
directly proportional to educational status. People in the higher educational cluster are
more likely to know about the TRC than are those who are illiterate or less educated,
84% who had received a SLC had heard about the TRC as opposed to only 58% of the
illiterate respondents (2008 Nepali Voices).
In my own research, I found knowledge of the commissions much lower. In February
2016, before the truth-seeking commissions began accepting complaints in Nepal, most of my
interviewees in Bardiya who experienced a gross violation of human rights when they were
younger than 18 years of age, including Kumar, had no knowledge of the TRC or CIEDP.
Similar to the findings in Nepali Voices (2008), lack of knowledge of the commissions was
correlated with educational status and, in addition, distance from the capital. However, those
with connections to victims’ organizations in Bardiya, regardless of their educational status, had
knowledge of the TRC and the CIEDP in February 2016. By the end of the complaint-taking
period in July 2016, the TRC claimed they received 55,000 complaints (personal interview with
member of the TRC) and the CIEDP claimed they received more than 2,800 complaints
(personal interview with member of the CIEDP). Yet, in conversations and interviews with
victims after the complaint-taking processes, many stated they did not fully understand the
purpose of the commissions although they had been convinced to file a complaint.
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In the Kathmandu Valley, comprised of three districts, there were five offices where
victims could file complaints: the national headquarters of the CIEDP, which only accepted
complaints regarding disappearances during the armed conflict, the TRC, which accepted all
conflict-era complaints other than disappearances, and three local peace committee offices. From
the village where I was residing in a rural village in Bardiya, it took me seven hours by public
transportation to reach the district headquarters of Gulariya where all victims in the district were
required to travel to file a complaint at the local peace committee office. Because there were only
two staff members in the local peace committee office accepting complaints, the local peace
committee office in Gulariya was often full and required victims to wait to meet with a staff
member. For victims without the access to resources to travel via motorbike or private car, it was
difficult, if not impossible, to travel to the LPC office to file their complaint and return home on
the same day. For victims already facing a lack of resources, the process was made more
difficult. While public transportation costs are low in Nepal, for rural victims, many of whom are
extremely poor, the cost of transportation combined with the loss of wages from taking the time
to file a complaint, and the task of arranging a place to sleep before returning home via public
transportation made filing a complaint extremely challenging.
Literacy in rural areas is considerably lower than in Kathmandu, and Nepalis who are
poor, from marginalized caste or ethnic groups, or women are far more likely to be illiterate
(Bennett 2006; Guneratne 2002; Masklak 2003; Robins 2012; Subba, et al. 2014). In addition, as
discussed in Chapter 5, attending school was made considerably more difficult by the armed
conflict (Caddell 2007; OHCHR Report 2012; van Wessel and van Hirtum 2013). Because the
process of filing complaints was written rather than oral, victims who were literate and had
knowledge of the truth-seeking commissions did not require the assistance of a staff member.
They could complete their forms independently and submit completed forms in an envelope
allowing them greater confidentiality.
Given that the truth commissions were implemented by the state, and the government
officials accepting complaints were nationally appointed, unsurprisingly, many victims
prioritized their confidentiality as a means to ensure their safety in rural areas. For victims who
were illiterate, they were forced to rely on a staff member of a government-instituted
commission to complete a form describing their experiences of human rights violations
committed by people representing the Nepali government or the Maoists, whose leaders,
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following the cessation of conflict, are in the highest levels of the Nepali government. In my
observations, the government office accepting complaints in Bardiya was often filled with
conflict victims, and the two staff members were constantly expressing how overwhelmed they
felt assisting victims to file complaints. Due to the lack of staff members, victims requiring
assistance were forced to wait and those giving statements verbally forced to do so without
privacy. Thus, again, victims’ pre-war access to education influenced their ability to participate
in state-led truth-seeking processes. Conversely, in Kathmandu, I rarely witnessed victims
waiting more than fifteen minutes to meet with a staff member. Conversations with members of
both commissions revealed they were aware of these barriers and unwilling to facilitate more
inclusive processes.
For victims who were literate, the complaint forms were prohibitive in their language and
space. Victims were given minimal space in which to write, and the complaint form requested
that victims describe the “gross violation of human rights.” As Robins (2011:78) argues
regarding the use of human rights language in processes of transitional justice in Nepal, “the
privileging of an external discourse can empower elites and outsiders at the expense of victims,
particularly the most disempowered, who have both the greatest needs and the least access to the
language of rights.” Further reestablishing power dynamics, marginalization, and exclusion, the
Government of Nepal and the commissions approved and printed all complaint forms in Nepali
and failed to hire staff fluent in other languages. The latest census, conducted in 2011, lists 123
languages spoken in Nepal.
The paper format, the language of the forms, the failure to hire staff fluent in languages
other than Nepali or to provide a private space during the complaint-taking processes all
reproduced the historical exclusion and marginalization of victims from the indigenous Tharu
community. As in the Interim Relief Program discussed in Chapter 5, the policies and practices
of Nepal’s truth commissions also demonstrate the politics of victimhood under the guise of
redressing conflict-era violations. Victims were reduced to a single criterion or essence within a
reconstituted display of exclusionary nationalism (see Calhoun 1997:18 on nationalist
essentialism). As Calhoun (1997:50) argues,
traditions are not simply inherited, they have to be reproduced; stories have to be told
over and again, parts of traditions have to be adapted to new circumstances to keep them
meaningful…
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Within the context of state-led truth commissions, among the stories powerful government
officials tell are that everyone in Nepal is both literate and Nepali speaking. The restrictions
imposed upon truth telling through written forms only available in Nepali highlight how the state
enforces and legitimizes historically embedded forms of homogenous and exclusionary
nationalism. Aspects of Nepal’s tradition of homogeneous nationalism have been simultaneously
reproduced and adapted to create a façade of inclusion, and yet, the performance of inclusion in
Nepal’s truth commissions only reproduces entrenched patterns of exclusion.
Further, the commissions, focused on gathering evidence, required victims to provide
documentation of the human rights violations they claimed to have experienced during Nepal’s
armed conflict. Members of both commissions repeatedly told me in interviews that they would
not review “complaints” that did not include sufficient evidence. This stipulation, in particular,
illuminates how the commissions performed inclusion while systemically placing barriers upon
victims marginalized from state processes. Without connections to the UN or an international
non-governmental organization, torture victims in Bardiya would have to seek “evidence” from
their torturers. I contend the stipulations placed upon victims were implemented to conceal state
complicity and protect political leaders from prosecution.
When I first met Anil in April 2016, he was aware of both truth-seeking commissions but
said he would not file a complaint due to his distrust of the process. He later filed a complaint
with the disappearance commission describing his knowledge about the death and burial of
fellow prisoners at the army barracks where he was held and also to the truth commission
concerning his own arrest and torture. In subsequent conversations, Anil talked about his
irritation with the process of filing a complaint with the truth commission. Staff from the
commissions told him that if he wanted his complaint to be considered then he must provide
evidence of his arrest and torture. Yet, due to his age (younger than 18) at the time of his arrest,
his name was excluded from the reports he filed with the OHCHR and the National Human
Rights Commission.
Thus, although the TRC policy explicitly states priority would be given to “children,”
Anil’s age at the time he filed reports of torture created additional barriers to his inclusion in
state-led truth-seeking processes. When he went to the National Human Rights Commission in
Kathmandu, their office stated they did not have documentation of his arrest or torture. Further,
the Government of Nepal requested the OHCHR to leave the country following the release of the
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2012 conflict report. Anil asked if I would help him to contact the OHCHR. Although we both
initiated contact with the OHCHR in an attempt to help Anil to receive the documentation
required by the TRC, we never received a response. After returning to the NHRC and explaining
the details of his arrest and torture, the office agreed to provide the report he had filed.
Kumar also decided to file a complaint with TRC. He learned about the process through
Priya and filed when the LPC staff, along with Priya and another member of a victims’
organization, assisted victims in his village to file complaints. He didn’t have “evidence” of his
torture, but submitted a complaint anyway hoping for “anything…if they provided something, it
would be good.” He also expressed his desire for medical treatment, financial compensation, the
prosecution of his torturer, and an escape for his children from kamaiya labor.
Anil and Kumar both experienced torture as children at the hands of the state despite their
divergent residences, access to resources, and caste membership. However, members of TRC
explained to me that given the high number of complaints they received, they were giving
priority to complaints with the greatest documentation. More specifically, members of the
commission explained, they would not investigate complaints without sufficient evidence, and
subsequently, Nepalis filing complaints without sufficient evidence would likely not be
recommended for financial reparations, compensation for medical treatment, vocational training,
or scholarships. Yet, members of both commissions expressed their intention to investigate and
recommend financial reparations for complaints with sufficient evidence. When I questioned
members of the commissions on what constituted sufficient evidence, they explained paper
documentation from the National Human Rights Commission, a non-governmental organization
or international non-governmental organization, a police report, and/or a letter from a local peace
committee would be accepted as evidence. But, as my research showed, not all victims of
Nepal’s armed conflict had access to reporting and documentation.
In an interview with a physician from a prominent non-governmental organization in
Kathmandu who worked with torture victims during the armed conflict, he stated that most
torture victims in Nepal are from marginalized communities without access to powerful political
connections. When they lack political connections, he continued, they don’t have the option of
filing a police report because the police are typically involved in victims’ torture. While this nongovernmental organization was able to provide some medical treatment to torture victims, the
staff lamented not having sufficient funding to follow up with victims. None of the torture

89

victims I interviewed in Bardiya had received financial compensation or medical treatment for
their torture. In November 2016, the Supreme Court ordered the TRC to investigate all cases.
Yet, members of the commission continually stated a complaint without sufficient evidence
would not be investigated further. Given the commission’s lack of sufficient staff to investigate
more than 58,000 cases, if they’re reviewed at all, it’s more likely that victims with greater
access to mechanisms of reporting will have their cases examined. If so, this may subsequently
lead to their receiving financial compensation or medical care to the exclusion of victims who
couldn’t provide sufficient evidence.
Conclusion
Victims’ positionalities have determined their access to transitional justice mechanisms in
Nepal; state-led truth commissions systemically excluded the most marginalized victims.
Victims’ preexisting access to knowledge and resources determined their ability to share their
knowledge or “truth” of their conflict-era human rights violations with the truth-seeking
commissions. Many victims wonder what kind of truth will be produced through Nepal’s TRC
and CIEDP given the political influence of the members of both commissions. Rather than
redress the human rights violations they experienced during armed conflict, through the
exclusion of victims generally, and marginalized groups specifically, processes of transitional
justice in Nepal have entrenched inequality and distrust in the government. My interviewees,
including Anil and Kumar, who were tortured as children described their ongoing fear and
distrust of the Nepal government, the police, and the Army.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I described how victims’ pre-war positionalities have impacted their
lives during the “transitional period.” In this chapter, the construction of “childhood” and the
performed inclusion of “children” are illuminated through ethnographic research with people
who, according to international law, are the intended beneficiaries of state-led transitional justice
mechanisms prioritizing children. Within this context, power has been restructured to present a
façade of inclusion through policies mandating that people from politically underrepresented
groups serve as members of Nepal’s truth commissions and that the commissions give priority to
“children,” among other groups. I contend the performance of the inclusion of “children” and
historically excluded groups in truth-seeking processes serve to maintain historically sedimented
patterns of exclusion.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Summary
During my preliminary research, children were often cited in interviews as “the most
affected” by Nepal’s armed conflict. And yet, 14 months of ethnographic research revealed the
concept of “children” within the context of transitional justice in Nepal is contested and
politicized. State-led transitional justice policies, although they mention “children,” do not
include stipulations for people who were children during the conflict that have now transitioned
into adulthood. In practice, this is confusing, because Nepal’s armed conflict started in 1996 and
ended with the signing of the peace agreement in 2006. However, the only state-led mechanisms
actualized thus far for victims of conflict-era human rights violations, the Interim Relief Program
and “complaint-taking” through two truth commissions, were implemented in 2008 and 2016
respectively. Although “children” are included in transitional justice policies, members of both
truth commissions gave divergent responses regarding definitions of “children” and what their
inclusion might mean more than ten years after the cessation of conflict.
This dissertation highlights how, in Nepal, access to mechanisms of transitional justice
mimics historical patterns of inequality and marginalization. While the Interim Relief Program
included scholarships for “children,” the stipulations, especially the policy defining children as
younger than 18, to qualify for and obtain the scholarships ensured some children’s exclusion.
Significantly, not all children were excluded. Interviews with members of both truth
commissions revealed the semblance, if not the practice, of inclusion and equality were
perceived as important. These findings led me to examine the ways in which inclusion is
performed through processes of transitional justice. I contend the performance of inclusion
through state-led transitional justice mechanisms serves to conceal the state’s commitment to
maintaining structural inequality. Further, the façade of inclusion functions as a distraction from
the demands for the social, economic, and political inclusion of marginalized groups on which
the armed conflict was fought.
People implementing transitional justice and peacebuilding mechanisms to help children
cited their own powerlessness to change systems of power that entrenched exclusion and
inequality. Transitional justice processes are typically employed alongside a liberal
peacebuilding model where democracy is touted as a bastion of freedom for all who reside
within the manmade boundaries of the state. Yet, in the Introduction, my interview with Udaya
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highlights that even within the UN system, freedom is illusory. Global systems of power, as
exemplified through the UN, ensure the continued exclusion of marginalized states from greater
access to resources and power. Further, when “democracy” is implemented through international
aid, national political leaders are beholden to diplomats, donors, and the UN rather than
accountable to their citizens. The influx of international aid in Nepal has, till now, increased
economic inequality between people with the greatest access to resources and people living in
extreme poverty. Much like the performance of the inclusion of children in transitional justice
processes, this begs the question: who and what do such illusions serve? Who benefits when
constraint is recognized as freedom and exclusion is performed through policies of inclusion and
redress? And, within these contexts where freedom and inclusion are performed, who has the
power and resources to negotiate and benefit from these structures?
In this dissertation, I examine how state-led processes of transitional justice serve as a
distraction from claims for equitable access to power and resources. This is particularly salient
within the Nepali context where the armed conflict was launched in a highly unequal society
with a history of feudalism. However, neither the conflict nor the “transitional period” have
redressed historically sedimented inequality and marginalization. Nepal’s current (2015)
constitution stipulates that nothing shall prevent special arrangements for the advancement,
empowerment, protection, and political representation of specific groups: victims of conflict,
families of the disappeared, women, children, laborers, the economically poor, Khas Arya, Dalit,
Adivasi Janajatis, Maheshis, Tharus, and other communities. Yet, the vast majority of Nepal’s
political leaders are Khas Arya, and the dominance of both the Nepali language and Hindu
religion are associated with Khas Arya migration into Nepal. The named inclusion of Khas Arya,
the traditionally politically and economically dominant group, as a protected group with Nepal’s
latest constitution ensures historically sedimented power structures can be maintained. There
have been changes over the last twenty years, to be sure, and inclusion has been performed in
various iterations: a peace agreement with provisions for social and economic justice for
marginalized groups; the drafting of a new constitution codifying the right to equality and
establishing Nepal as a multiethnic, multi-religious, and multicultural federal democratic
republic with special arrangements for specific groups; and transitional justice policies that list
women, children, and indigenous groups as priorities. Nevertheless, my research demonstrates
how Nepali elites have reorganized to secure their grasp on power while claiming to redress

92

conflict-era rights violations. Dominant ideologies of nation-states and nationalism present
particular geographic boundaries as containing a homogenous group of people who can be
understood by certain simple characteristics. The primacy of the Nepali language in education,
land contracts, and governance is one example of how homogenizing ideologies of nationalism
have excluded the majority of the population.
In the Introduction, Udaya describes how international development frameworks and
homogeneous iterations of nationalism, particularly as exemplified through Nepal’s formal
education system, are the “cause of violence” and “‘unpeace’ in the life of Nepali people.”
Further, international development policies led to the proliferation of private English-medium
schools, which have only widened the gap in access to resources, namely lucrative employment
in Kathmandu and abroad, between historically privileged and marginalized groups. Chapter 5
examines the significance of education in Nepal and the long history of inequitable access to
schooling. During the armed conflict, Maoists sought to combat inequitable access to education
by banning private schools; both private and public schools were significant sites during the
armed conflict as school buildings, teachers, and students were affected by Maoist combatants
and state security forces. I examine the meanings that victims and their families in Bardiya
assigned to education and their experiences of inequitable access to scholarships targeting
“conflict affected children” as part of Nepal’s Interim Relief Program and contend knowing/not
knowing are utilized to conceal systems of power that ensure the continued exclusion of Nepal’s
most marginalized groups. I argue the barriers conflict victims in Bardiya experienced trying to
access scholarships demonstrate not only that structural inequality still exists during the
“transitional” period but also that the state is committed to maintaining it.
Inequality on the basis of diverse identities within Nepal was presented as a problem that
could be dealt with through the named inclusion of certain groups within transitional justice and
nation-building policies. Despite hundreds of years of structured exclusion based on various
aspects of people’s identities, named groups targeted through transitional justice mechanisms,
such as “children” were treated as static and homogenous. In this dissertation, I challenge
homogenous and fixed conceptualizations of “children” and “the local” and analyze the diverse
and dynamic ways in which people experience armed conflict and its aftermath as I examine how
power also reorganizes in dynamic ways.
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In Nepal, transitional justice is utilized, politicized, and manipulated by powerful
domestic and international actors. The UN, along with most international non-governmental
organizations, diplomats, and donors, boycotted Nepal’s truth commissions for, among other
reasons, their politicization and the inclusion of amnesty provisions for gross violations of
human rights. This position obscures the role of international development in increasing
economic inequality and marginalization in Nepal, the complicity of international actors (i.e. the
U.S., the U.K., and India) in providing logistical and financial support to state security forces as
they committed gross violations of human rights against civilians, and the international
community’s prioritization of liberal peacebuilding rather than redress for the poorest and most
marginalized victims through access to basic resources. Following ten years of armed conflict to
ameliorate structural inequality, state-led transitional justice mechanisms have served to entrench
the exclusion of economically, politically, and socially marginalized groups and ensure Nepalis’
continued distrust in the national government. Thus, while addressing structural inequality may
be beyond the reach of normative transitional justice mechanisms, the Nepali context
demonstrates how processes of transitional justice cannot redress conflict-era gross violations of
human rights without redressing inequitable systems of power.
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